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Exchange Rate Volatility: the Impact of 
Learning Behaviour and the Institutional 
Framework




Traditional macroeconom ic models fail to explain short- and 
medium-term volatility o f foreign exchange rates. Following the 
new strand o f market microstructure approaches to  the problem, 
we model the dynamic optim ization problem o f a m onopolistic 
market maker who faces uncertainty about some fundamental pa­
rameter and whose foreign currency position has to be closed by 
the end o f the day. The set-up allows to identify an unambiguously 
positive effect the institutional framework may exert on exchange 
rate volatility. Furthermore we find that a simplistic, adaptive 
learning behavior is a likely candidate for explaining observed pric­
ing patterns. When com pleted by com petition the model reveals 
incentives to  choose less rational ways o f behavior.
'Keywords: Exchange rates, exchange rate volatility, learning, market microstruc­
ture, market organisation.- 1 would like to thank Professors A. Kirman and S. Vassi- 
lakis, and G. Fernandez de Cordoba for many useful discussions and comments, and 
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We try to explain the commonly observed phenomenon of excess volatility 
in foreign exchange markets: Exchange rates often are excessively volatile 
relative to the fluctuations of the economy’s relevant fundamentals.
The idea we develop is the following: Traders usually face an uncer­
tain environment in which they try to learn the value of some unknown 
fundamental parameter in order to improve their optimization behavior. 
As is well known, there are very efficient ways of learning those parame­
ters such as Bayesian or least squares learning. However, in the course of 
things we will exclude those behaviors as likely explanations since they 
simply do not reproduce the kind of volatility we observe in reality.
Instead we assume and will show that adaptive learning behavior is 
a much more likely candidate for explaining the kind of pricing patterns 
we observe. It is more likely not only for the degree o f excess volatility 
it is able to create. But - as will be seen in the course of this and 
a subsequent paper1 - traders also have a strong incentive to use this 
updating pattern since it may allow for higher profits than a more efficient 
updating rule does. For this reason it is not even necessary to refer to 
the concept of bounded rationality in order to justify the use of a less 
sophisticated learning behavior. It can rather be argued that traders in 
financial markets are behaving fully rationally when deciding to apply an 
unsophisticated learning rule. In other words: Choosing from a menu of 
different rationality levels the seemingly least rational one can be seen as 
a sign of full rationality.- If instead one sees the concept o f fully rational 
agents as too unrealistic it is still possible in this framework to argue that 
agents are boundedly rational and behave adaptively for this reason.
We then investigate how exchange rate volatility is influenced by a 
change of the institutional framework and, in our subsequent paper2, 





























































































specific institutional setting - i.e. the length of the trading day in our case 
- does have an unambiguous impact for all applied variance measures.
Naturally, all of these findings become reinforced or weakened with 
different levels of clients’ sensitivity to price and a changing volume of 
trade. Also the subjective prior belief and the size of the parameter to 
be learned show to have a significant impact on exchange rate variability.
The paper will follow the subsequent plan: After an introduction to 
the foreign exchange market and the market microstructure literature 
we theoretically model a monopolist in the foreign exchange market and 
present a menu of possible updating behavior.
In order to see the impact of the updating behavior we simulate this 
model, starting with a single trading day. This allows us to get a first 
idea of updating’s impact and to see the various variables impact on 
volatility.
We then look at the performance of the different learning rules in 
the long run in terms of: Convergence/volatility, stability, and prof­
its. Furthermore we want to see whether there is a ’’dominant strat­
egy” in the sense that a trader would always prefer to follow one specific 
updating rule even when competing against other behavioral patterns 
( ’competition’ in the monopoly case obviously refers to some kind of 
rule/performance comparison the trader undertakes by himself).
Finally we check how a change in the institutional setting, i.e. the 
length of the trading day, influences the volatility behavior that has been 
detected so far.- We conclude comparing our results with the literature.
2 Some Stylized Facts about Exchange Rates
In this section we are going to give a basic description of the foreign 
exchange market3 and present some stylized facts concerning the spot
3For the institutional characteristics of this market see further below the section: 




























































































intra-daily foreign exchange rates.4 These will provide some motivation 
for the subsequent research.
The foreign exchange market is an international market in which buy­
ers and sellers of currencies meet. The word ’’ meeting” should not be 
taken literally since predominantly it is a decentralized market in which 
participants communicate via telephone, computer networks, or telex and 
are physically separated from each other. It is a 24 hours global market 
which only over weekends mostly is inactive. While being global through 
communication technologies there are three main physical centers of ac­
tivity: Tokyo in Asia, London in Europe, and New York City in America.
With a daily turnover of USD 832 billion in 19925 the foreign ex­
change market is the biggest financial market. This volume has been 
rapidly growing - it more than tripled over the period 1986-1992 - due to 
the growing importance of transaction driven short-term investments rel­
ative to long-term investments by non-financial institutions. GDDMOP 
(1994) attribute the quick expansion of intra-daily transaction flows to 
the development of real-time information systems and to the decrease of 
transaction costs following the liberalization of financial markets. Short- 
and long-term transactions in the retail market face a four to five times 
higher transactions volume in the intra-day wholesale market. This re­
sults from the fact that traders reduce their risk with each other through 
mutual insurance since usually they are not allowed to have open posi­
tions overnight.
Spot market operations account for about 64 percent of the total vol­
ume of a market-maker’s transactions; the remaining part is divided be­
tween 24 percent swap transactions, 8 percent futures and options, and 
5 percent outright forward transactions.6 The stylized facts described 
below focus on the nominal intra-daily spot exchange rates of major cur-
4The following presentation draws mainly on: Brock (1996), Flood (1991), and 
Guillaume, Dacorogna. Dave, Mueller, Olsen, Pictet (1994), hereafter: GDDMOP.
°Bank for International Settlements, 1993.




























































































rencies. Experience has shown that well known empirical regularities 
o f daily or weekly data do not always translate into intra-daily analy­
sis (GDDMOP, p.2). It is possible that the different structure of these 
financial markets is partly responsible for this fact. GDDMOP regard 
as one of their key-findings the complexity of the intra-day spot market 
which results from the interaction of heterogeneous agents which differ 
in geographical locations, risk profiles, and various types of institutional 
constraints. This heterogeneity contrasts with the homogeneity of mar­
ket agents which is found at lower frequencies such as daily or weekly 
data.
It is important to understand what is meant by the term ’’ price” 
in the foreign exchange market. One has to distinguish between quoted 
prices, transaction prices, and equilibrium prices. Quoted prices are often 
reported as ’tick-by-tick’ data. These high frequency data are computed 
as the average of the bid and ask of every observation. Reporting the 
average rather than taking the bid or ask series as an approximation 
of the price has the advantage that if the market is adjusting in one 
direction the directional change of the average price will indicate this 
clearly, whereas the level of the bid or ask may not if, e.g., a trader skews 
the spread in order to attract business on a particular side. Transaction 
prices, on the other hand, may differ from the quoted prices which are 
indicative only. Indicative quotes are the bids and asks that are posted 
to all potential customers. Traders usually quote better prices to each 
other so that actual transactions often take place within and not at the 
announced spread.7 Equilibrium prices, finally, are those prices at which 
demand and supply become balanced.- While in the following we will 
be concerned with high frequency data the context should always define 
clearly the intended meaning of the term ’’price” .
Stylized Fact 1: Returns are negatively first-order autocorrelated. 
This observation is interesting since one would expect the markets to ad-





























































































just to quotes through a series of transactions and, hence, to exhibit pos­
itive autocorrelation. Yet, at a very high frequency this is not the case. 
Several explanations have been offered for this phenomenon: Traders 
could have divergent opinions about the direction into which a piece of 
news should affect the market (in other words: Traders are heteroge­
neous.). Another explanation is order imbalances of market-makers who 
consequently skew the spread into a particular direction.8 Finally, as a 
matter of fact spreads differ between banks - due to different cost struc­
tures e.g. - which can cause prices to bounce forth and back between 
banks.9
Fact 2: The amplitude of the spread is positively related to volatil­
ity and inversely to the tick frequency. In periods of higher risk such 
as instances of important news releases market-makers tend to protect 
themselves with a larger spread. In periods of a low tick frequency such 
as the closing or opening of markets, lunch breaks, or on weekends the 
spread widens considerably.10
Fact 3: Seasonality. Strong seasonal patterns can be observed for 
the volatility, the volatility ratio, the directional change frequency, the 
relative spread, and the tick frequency. The seasonal patterns exist for 
the hour of the day, the day of the week, and the geographical location 
of traders.11 GDDMOP introduce a rescaling of time which shortens 
periods with little trading activity and magnifies periods with a lot of 
trading activity. They show that this not only controls effectively for 
non-stationarities but also support their vision of trader heterogeneity at 
all time scales.
Fact 4: High System Complexity. The dynamics of the foreign ex­
change market cannot be explained bv a system of relatively low complex­
8Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993)
9ibid.
10Goodhart (1989), Bollerslev and Domovitz (1993), and Mueller et. al. (1990).
11Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993), Dacorogna et. al. (1993), Mueller and Sgier 




























































































ity - even if small stochastic perturbations are present.12 Investigations 
into the complexity of the foreign exchange market are motivated by the 
global unpredictability of foreign exchange rates13, by the presence of 
non-linearities14, and the mixed impact of news on exchange rates.
Fact 5: High short- and long-term volatility autocorrelation. As 
regards volatility and its clustering in the short-run there is a high auto­
correlation or predictability observable. A possible explanation for this 
phenomenon is the learning process of traders with different priors: After 
the arrival of important news it may take them a couple of hours of trad­
ing before resolving their expectational differences. Long-term memory, 
on the other hand, may last more than 55 days.15 A possible explanation 
here is traders’ response to several autocorrelated news arrival processes 
which correspond to different time-horizons.16
Markets’ short- and long-term memory can also be found for the 
spread and the directional change frequency. No explanations have been 
put forward for the latter observation.
Fact 6: Mixed impact of news. Goodhart (1989) found out that 
’’ small” news from Reuters news page have no significant effect on the 
behavior of foreign exchange rates. The impact of the price formation 
seems to outweigh the impact of arriving news. Major economic news, 
on the other hand, such as GDP growth figures, budget deficit, etc. do 
have a significant impact on the size of exchange rate volatility.
Fact 7: Conditional predictability: While evidence of out-of-sample 
predictability is generally weak17 for the short-term it is good if one 
conditions on the ’’ right information sets” . Examples for such informa­
12Guil!aume (1993).
13Goodhart and Figliuoli (1992)
14Guillaume et al. (1994a)
loDacorogna et al. (1993).
16Haubrich and Lo (1992), GDDMOP (1994).
17Diebold and Nason (1990) and Meese and Rose (1990) showed a zero evidence for 




























































































tion sets are: Near-past volatility and volume 18 19(predictability increases 
when near-past volatility and volume decrease); technical trading rules 
19; and lagged volume for near-future returns 20 (price reversals tend to 
follow abnormally high volume). Evidence o f out-of-sample predictabil­
ity is weak. But there is evidence of good short-term predictability if 
conditioning is done on the ’’ right” information set. Thus, directional 
price changes are systematically forecastable conditional on the state of 
the volatility at different time horizons.21 Furthermore, volatility on a 
very short time horizon can be systematically predicted by the volatil­
ity on a longer time-horizon, e.g. hourly volatility by daily volatility.22 
As GDDMOP argue, possibly important news first affect middle-term 
traders (over 1 day) and then trickle down to short-term traders.
Fact 8: Distributional instability. Andersen (1994) and Guillaume 
et al. (1994a) make use of de-seasonalizing time scales. Their findings 
suggest that the distributional instability may be due to different infor­
mation flows and learning processes of traders with differing objective 
functions. In such an environment it is no longer possible to express 
all information in the conditional density function of a single stochastic 
process.
We will now take a look at economic theory and see how it has tried 
so far to explain the characteristics of foreign exchange rates.
18(LeBaron 1992a.b).
19(LeBaron (1994)).
20(Antoniewicz (1992. 1993). LeBaron (1992a.b).
21Mueller et al. (1994).




























































































3 Traditional Approaches to Exchange Rate 
Determination and Their Failure
An impressive literature on asset price volatility, both at a theoretical 
and empirical level, had been prompted for by erratic fluctuations in 
stock prices and - since the beginning of the floating period in the early 
seventies - exchange rates.23 Traditional approaches to the determination 
of exchange rates made use of macroeconomic modeling techniques. But 
while these macroeconomic models explained exchange rate behavior rea­
sonably well in the long-run their short-run forecasts were unsatisfactory. - 
In the following a brief overview of traditional exchange rate literature 
will be given in order to help the reader understand better the starting 
point and basic questions of market microstructure theory.
Within the traditional macro-approach to floating exchange rate de­
termination the monetary model can be seen as the most fundamen­
tal one. It considers the exchange rate as the relative price of foreign 
and domestic money the size of which, consequently, is determined by 
the relative supply and demand for these moneys (e.g. Mussa (1976)). 
Different variations can be applied in modeling this relationship such 
as prices being either sticky or flexible, or the interest rate differential 
satisfying uncovered interest parity or containing some adjustment for 
risk. However, empirical testing of the simple monetary model resulted 
in unsatisfactory outcomes: Coefficient estimates and empirical fit were 
never particularly good, apart, perhaps, under hyperinflation conditions; 
high volatility of real exchange rates required an explicit treatment; and 
out-of-sample forecasts were fairly poor (see e.g. Frenkel and Johnson 
(1978)).
The empirical observation of a high correlation between nominal and 
real exchange rates at high frequencies and a low one at low frequencies
23For an excellent review of the literature on empirical nominal exchange rate re­




























































































put the assumption of flexible prices into question. In a new approach the 
latter postulation was given up and goods-market prices were modeled as 
sticky in the short-run instead. Dornbusch (1970) demonstrated that in 
the short-run nominal exchange rates may thus overshoot their long-run 
levels.- Empirical testing of various types of sticky-price models showed 
mixed success (for a brief overview of the empirical literature on sticky 
prices see e.g. Frankel and Rose (1995)).
Another approach to modelling exchange rates has been the portfolio- 
balance model. Its principal difference to monetary models of exchange 
rates is the assumption that domestic and foreign assets are not perfect 
substitutes which causes a risk premium to enter the uncovered interest 
parity condition and the supply of noil-monetary assets such as bonds to 
enter the equation of exchange rate determination. The exchange rate 
is thus not only dependent on the demand and supply of money but 
also of domestic and foreign assets. Empirical tests of this literature are 
surveyed in Lewis (1995).
A further empirical fact remained that was difficult to reconcile with 
the existing theory: The major part of foreign exchange rate fluctuations 
could not be explained with net flows of goods and capital that take 
place between countries. A possible explanation for this observation is 
that these fluctuations depend on news about the political and economic 
environment which could imply changes in the future value o f a given 
currency. This idea lead to the notion that the foreign exchange rate 
is not just the equilibrium price of flow supply and demand over time. 
Rather it is the price that results from expectations o f income which can 
be obtained by holding assets in various currency denominations where 
expectations are sensitive to those news. Volatility can thus be rational­
ized by expectations revisions that are induced by new information, i.e. 
by ” news” .
Turning to the out-of-sample forecasting ability o f fundamental-based 
models Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b) made a rather discomforting finding: 




























































































exchange rate models they showed that a simple random-walk ” model” of 
exchange rates outperforms more complex structural models at short and 
medium horizons. This is true even when ex post information on future 
fundamentals such as money and output is provided to the structural 
models. Subsequent empirical research has never been able to disprove 
these findings for the short-run.
Summarizing, it seems that models that try to explain or forecast 
exchange rates with macroeconomic fundamentals do have little explana­
tory power or forecasting ability compared to simple alternatives. Fur­
thermore, the findings of Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b), Campbell anti 
Clarida (1987), and Flood and Rose (1993) suggest that this is not just 
a failure of some specific models but rather that in general no model 
which is based on fundamentals like money supply, interest rates, in­
flation rates, etc. will be capable to explain or predict a high part of 
short- or medium-term exchange rate variability. The difficulty to pre­
dict future movements in exchange rates suggests that the information 
contained in those variables is of limited value only. The striking differ­
ence between the volatility of these macro variables and that of exchange 
rates insinuates the, at least partial, relevance of information extrinsic to 
the included variables.24
Furthermore, the highly aggregative character of macromodels which 
try to capture all determinants of demand and supply of foreign exchange 
requires often, in compensation, the adoption of simplifying assumptions 
such as: Information is perfect, agents are identical, and trading is cost­
less. Since one of the most important implications of these assumptions 
is the absence o f a motivation for trading (which contrasts highly with 
the high volume of daily transactions observed in foreign exchange mar­
kets) one can wonder whether a more realistic specification of the foreign 
exchange market might solve some of the empirical problems.
24Theories of rational speculative bubbles and speculative attacks do allow for some 
explanation of excess volatility: But they are not capable to show when and why 




























































































4 The Market Microstructure Approach
Relatively little seems to be understood about the short-run behavior of 
prices and trading volumes in financial markets. Sharp price movements 
can be observed at times during which those variables which are con­
sidered economic fundamentals change very little. While the above de­
scribed findings could give rise to pessimism versus exchange rate research 
a new approach has developed which analyzes the market for foreign ex­
change from a microeconomic perspective - the market microstructure 
approach. The cardinal difference to traditional modelling is that the 
exchange rate is no longer considered as a macroeconomic phenomenon. 
Microstructural analysis rather focuses on the behavior of participants in 
the foreign exchange market and on the impact of information and insti­
tutional rules. I.e., it is concerned with the trading process itself and on 
how specific trading rules change the equilibrium behavior of prices. At 
the same time the assumption of identical agents is no longer maintained. 
In the majority of microstructural models it is implicitly taken as given 
that market participants are heterogeneous. They do not only differ in 
such key determinants of economic behavior as wealth, preferences, and 
information; but beyond the latter also in differences in opinions and 
beliefs. These heterogeneous agents interact with each other in the mar­
ket where the specific kind of interaction is dependent on the way the 
market is organized. This in turn can have important consequences for 
the evolution of prices.
Studying the microstructure of markets touches the more fundamen­
tal issue of how prices are formed in an economy. In standard economic 
modeling of price determination the equilibrium price is given where sup­
ply and demand schedules meet. But relatively little is said about how 
this equilibrium point is reached and how individuals’ different prefer­
ences are coordinated. One of the reasons for this is its argued irrele­
vance: Economic analysis is mainly concerned with states o f equilibrium. 




























































































they can be analyzed without considering the actual mechanics through 
which the equilibrium is attained.25 This implies however the premise 
that the actual trading mechanism has no influence on the equilibrium 
outcome.26
Another approach did regard the procedure of price formation but us­
ing a fictitious price-setting process: The tattonement of the Walrasian 
auctioneer. The market price arises through a series of preliminary auc­
tions in which traders readjust supplies and demands so long until an 
equilibrium price is found at which no trader wishes to revise his orders 
any more. No trading is allowed outside equilibrium; the auction proce­
dure is costless so that there are no frictions in the exchange process.- 
Walras based this price discovery model on the actual mechanics of the 
Paris Bourse. But while the model helps imagining the process of price 
formation it is questionable that it captures the actual process of many 
markets. Markets differ significantly in their organizational set-up. And 
if trading is more complex than the simple matching of supply and de­
mand the behavior of traders can play an important role.
These considerations lead to specific analyses o f the intermediation 
activity of dealers itself which revealed new aspects of the price process.27 
If, for example, a market exhibits frictions such as a cost of imme­
diate trading then the resulting outcome could in fact be a twofold 
price depending on traders time preferences for trading. The Walrasian 
tattonement, instead, allowed for a single equilibrium price only.28 Subse­
2oE.g. in the rational expectations literature this approach to price setting can be 
identified.
26For a discussion of the issue whether the equilibrium discussed in rational expec­
tations models is actually ever attained, i.e. whether there is any trading mechanism 
that can implement such an equilibrium, see O ’Hara (1995), Section 4.3.
27The first economists to draw attention to the important role of stock dealers 
probably were Working (1953), Houthakker (1957), and Baumol (1952). Demsetz 
(1968), quoted most often, was the first to give a more direct analysis of trading and 
is therefore said to be the starting point of formal market microstructure.




























































































quent research investigated the impact of different trading mechanisms, 
specific market structures, and the interaction between these elements 
and trader behavior.
Before presenting in more detail the modelling approaches to traders’ 
behavior - on which the original research of this paper builds - and their 
main results a description of the institutional basics of the foreign ex­
change market will be given.
4.1 Institutional Characteristics of the Foreign Ex­
change Market
Knowledge of the specific institutional characteristics of a market is im­
portant in microstructure theory because one of its principal assumptions 
is that the particular microstructure of a market affects the evolution of 
prices.
In order to give a characterization of the foreign exchange market it 
is necessary to describe its participants, the mechanics of trading, and 
its auction structure.29
The participants in the foreign exchange market can be classified as 
market makers, brokers, customers, and central banks where market- 
makers - at commercial and investment banks - make up for the biggest 
share. They are agents who, upon request, provide a two-way quote, 
i.e. both buy and sell (bid and ask) prices and thus create or ’’ make” 
a market. They can do so in one or more currencies. When a market- 
maker, on the other hand, orders to buy or sell a specific quantity at a 
specific price from a broker this so called limit order will be kept in the 
broker’s book. Upon demand the broker then quotes the best bid and 
ask price from this book. While market-makers may trade on their own 
account this is not possible for a broker. Also, the latter cannot contact 
any customers. The service they provide rather is one of bringing together
29For an introductory overview of microstructure theory and the foreign exchange 




























































































market-makers for which they charge a profitgenerating fee.
The other market participants are central banks who may try to move 
exchange rates or pursue international transactions, and the customers 
of the market-making banks. Customers usually try to accomplish their 
transactions in international trade via the foreign exchange market.
As for the mechanics of trading there is a significant difference be­
tween transactions in the direct or customers market and brokered trans­
actions: Brokers collect limit orders from market-makers (specified with 
respect to size and price) which then remain with the broker until another 
market-maker has been found who is willing to transact at the broker's 
quote. The brokerage fee is shared by the banks involved in the trans­
action. In interbank deals, on the other hand, banks contact each other 
directly and transactions take place without any third intermediary. The 
bank who is receiving a call quotes a bid and an ask price and acts thus 
as a market maker without knowing whether the calling party wants to 
buy or sell a given currency. Quantities traded usually follow multiples 
of some customary amounts. Payment or so called "value” date of a 
completed spot deal is two business days later to allow for settlement 
arrangements.
Confronting these two methods of interbank trading there seem to be 
a couple of advantages of brokered trades: Order dissemination between 
market-makers is rather swift; absence of any obligation to provide a 
market to the counterparty; anonymity in quoting is preserved. This 
latter quality allows a quoting bank to hide its identity and thus its 
possible strategic intentions.
Considering transactions with customers it can be noted that they 
only take place with market-makers but never go through brokers. The 
reason for this is the latter’s difficulty in monitoring a customer’s cred­
itworthiness. This task can be accomplished more easily by a bank of 
which the customer may already be a client. The procedure of customer 
trading strongly resembles the one of interbank trading: A customer is 




























































































two-way quote. Again, it is not known to the market-maker whether the 
potential client intends to buy or to sell. The main difference between 
customer and interbank trading lies in the fact that a customer will never 
have to provide a market himself.30
From the above description it has become obvious that the foreign 
exchange market combines two different auction structures: The bro­
kered market and the interbank direct market. While the latter can be 
characterized as a decentralized, continuous, open-bid, double-auction 
market, the former can be classified as a "quasi-centralized” , continuous, 
limit-book, single-auction market. The interbank market is decentralized 
in that price quotations and transactions are happening in exclusive en­
counters between agents, i.e. usually on the phone. Prices, thus, are not 
public and other traders have no access to this specific trading opportu­
nity as would be the case in a centralized market. However, the brokered 
market, on the other hand, cannot be called completely centralized be­
cause of the multitude of brokers present there each of whom only stores 
a part of the total amount of market-makers’ limit orders.31
Both types of markets are continuous markets as opposed to call 
markets. This specification refers to the time dimension of transaction 
consolidation. Trading does not occur at predefined moments in time, the 
so called "calls” , where transaction orders arriving in between two calls 
are retained until the next call; rather transaction orders are processed 
immediately as they arrive.32
10Although foreign exchange market actors also deal for future value date this will 
not be considered here since it is irrelevant for the contents of this paper .
S1 Differences in the degree of centralization can have an impact on market perfor­
mance: Centralized trading and price information, as usual for brokerage, can gener­
ate gains in efficiency and consequently imply economies of scale. (See e.g. Garbade 
( 1978).)
32While most microeconomic models assume call markets (e.g. the Walrasian 
tattonement model) the type of consolidation chosen can affect the outcome of a 
market process. To see this imagine a continuous market where past transactions 




























































































In an open-bid market price information is communicated to all par­
ticipants in the market. The interbank market is approximating this 
structure with the important difference that pairing of communicating 
agents is bilateral only. The market is called open-bid. however, since in 
principle for every agent it is possible to contact a market-maker and ask 
for a quote.- Also in the brokered market the contact between market- 
maker and broker is bilateral. Yet, as was described above, the broker 
does not fully reveal the contents o f his order book but quotes the best 
bid and ask prices only.
Finally, due to the market-making activity of traders in the direct 
interbank market always both, bid and ask prices, are quoted on request. 
It is this characteristic of price quotations to which the term double­
auction refers: Prices are provided on both sides of the market. Brokers, 
on the other hand, aggregate single-auction quotes: When a market- 
maker gives a limit buy-order, or alternatively limit sell-order, a broker 
aggregates these respective quotes into two-way inside spreads. It can 
happen that a broker’s book may be empty on one or both sides in which 
case he will give a single quote only or none at all rather than making a 
market.33
4.2 Modelling of Market Makers’ Behavior
While the institutional characteristics of the foreign exchange market are 
basic to the microstructure literature its main concern is the modeling 
of market participants’ behavior. In the vast existing research two main 
points of interest can be identified: Explanations of price movements and 
the bid-ask spread, and market participants’ treatment of price informa-
consequent price changes for later transactions. Thus, ultimately, with continuous 
trading allocations, the price discovery process, and the ultimate equilibrium price 
can be significantly different from a call market setting. (For theoretical work on this 
see e.g. Hahn (1984) or Negishi (1962).)
33As for the impact of the described market charateristica on market efficiency of 





























































































4.2.1 Spread Explanations and Price Movements
Research that was trying to understand how market prices arise had to 
face a non-trivial problem: The explanation of the phenomenon that in 
the same market two prices for a single commodity can be observed, 
i.e. in other words the existence of a spread. Modeling approaches to 
this problem were complex since a considerable amount of institutional 
detail had to be included. In principal, three lines of explanations were 
developed: A spread can arise due to the cost of dealer services, the 
cost of inventory holding, and/or the cost of adverse selection.34 We will 
begin with describing the first motive.
Provision of Liquidity Services It was said above that Demsetz 
(1968) had introduced the possibility of some cost in trading. This cost 
did not so much consist in some kind of fee imposed by a market. Rather 
the difference in time between order placement and execution possibility 
could impose real costs on investors. For the possibility to buy and sell 
immediately when desired, without having to face any waiting time, a 
price had to be payed: A higher buy or a lower sell rate, respectively.
Let us describe Demsetz’ ideas more explicitly: In a continuous mar­
ket with aggregate supply and demand schedules for a security under 
ideal circumstances investors would meet simultaneously and the market
34In what follows the main arguments of the first two motives are presented, con­
centrating on those aspects that will be of importance in the main part of the paper.
While the adverse selection argument is not described in more detail since it will 
not be of use later on its basic argument can be summarized along the following line: 
A market maker confronts two types of traders, liquidity- and information-motivated 
traders. Both have to pay a spread for the liquidity services offered by the market 
maker. However, due to their insider information the information-motivated traders 
can speculate profitably at the market maker’s expense. Therefore the latter charges 
both types a wider spread in order to protect himself from losses to the better informed 




























































































would clear at a certain equilibrium price. But while over the long-run 
the number o f sellers and buyers may match, in the short-run, most 
likely, there will be a coordination problem. Since by assumption the 
market is continuous and there is no mechanism for holding orders over 
time there can be a disequilibrium at any given, instant if customers who 
wish to sell immediately cannot find other customers wishing to buy im­
mediately. Such an imbalance will make it impossible to find a market 
clearing price.
However, following Demsetz. at any point of time there are two de­
mand and supply schedules present in the market: One of those traders 
who wish to transact immediately, and one o f those who wish to trans­
act but without any specific preferences of when to do so. In order to 
overcome a disequilibrium situation those traders who wish to transact 
immediately either have to wait or can induce the other group to accept 
a deal by offering a higher price. The price of an asset thus contains a 
cost element: The cost of ” predictable immediacy” . Security dealers who 
are standing ready to deal on immediate demand produce this service of 
immediacy or liquidity.
While Demsetz developed this model for the securities market it can 
easily be applied to the foreign exchange market35: If customers of differ­
ent countries need to convert currencies in a given short period but are 
not able to communicate with each other without cost they may place 
their orders with some foreign exchange dealer. The dealers stand ready 
to trade on immediate demand. Their intention, however, is not to hold 
the acquired currency but to sell it back to other customers at a later 
point of time. Selling it back they will charge a higher price in order to 
profit on their liquidity service. Therefore, the dealers’ supply curve lies 
everywhere above the customers’ supply curve. Similarly, their demand 
curve lies everywhere below the customers’ demand curve. The distance 
between the dealers’ buying and selling price is called the bid-ask spread.




























































































The equilibrium exchange rate in this model is given at the intersec­
tion of the customers’ demand curve and the dealers’ supply curve. This 
is the equilibrium ask-rate for a transaction in which customers wish to 
buy foreign currency. Similarly, if they wish to sell foreign currency, the 
equilibrium bid-rate is given at the intercept of the customers’ supply 
curve and the dealers’ demand curve. At these equilibrium prices buy 
and sell orders will match as long as the environment which generates 
customer orders does not change.
Demsetz thus provided a formal rationale for the spread observable 
in security and foreign exchange markets. More important, may be, he 
showed that the price is an outcome of the optimizing behavior of eco­
nomic agents. Therefore, in order to understand how an equilibrium price 
arises the behavior o f such an agent had to be analyzed. Furthermore, 
the behavior of a market as a whole can be regarded as the aggregation 
of individual trader behavior.
Inventory Models At the beginning of inventory model research stood 
the question of how one could interpret the equilibrium price determining 
demand and supply schedules when buyers and sellers arrive at different 
points of time. Or in other words: To which time periods do these sched­
ules refer in such a situation of disequilibrium?
This concern was first addressed in a paper by Garman (1976). In 
order to capture the temporal imbalances he characterized demand and 
supply as stochastic processes rather than looking at individual market 
participants’ trading intentions. A monopolistic, profit maximizing mar­
ket maker then faces the considerable problem to balance his level of 
inventory and cash in a context in which the flow of buys and sells is 
stochastic and non-synchronous. His finite capitalization level imposes 
upper and lower bounds on his allowable inventory. Due to the random 
walk of market orders bankruptcy, therefore, has a positive probability 
and can, in a different setting, be equal to one. The important outcome 




























































































a spread in order to protect himself from certain bankruptcy. His prices 
he sets at a profit maximizing level such that the order arrival rates are 
equated.
Garman’s approach is interesting in that it shows the complexity of a 
dealer’s price setting problem. But it is too unrealistic in assuming that 
the dealer can set his prices only once, at the beginning of time. Due 
to this assumption the inventory plays no role in his decision problem 
although it is key for the dealer’s survival.
The approach taken by Amihud and Mendelson (1980, 1982) proves 
more realistic. They reformulate Garman’s analysis and explicitly in­
corporate inventory in the dealer’s pricing problem. Prices can be dy­
namically adjusted. They are able to show that bid and ask prices - 
the same decision variables as in Garman - now depend on the level of 
the inventory and can thus change over time along with the inventory 
position.
The dealer faces market order flows of buys and sells that are repre­
sented as independent Poisson processes. The arrival rates depend on the
i t
ask and bid prices which are the dealer’s decision variables. An impor­
tant difference to Garman’s model is that the inventory level is bounded 
above and below by some exogenous parameters. This eliminates the 
possibility of bankruptcy since the dealer cannot run out of inventory 
any more, and it allows to concentrate the analysis on the relationship 
between inventory and prices.- The dealer’s objective is to maximize ex­
pected profit per unit time where profits are a function of the expected 
cash flow per unit time at a certain inventory position and of the prob­
ability to be at this inventory level. His resulting optimal bid and ask 
prices exhibit certain interesting properties: First, the prices are differ­
ent from each other and thus provide a positive spread. Second, both 
prices are dynamically adjusted up and down by the dealer in order to 
control the inventory position: When the inventory level is low prices are 
adjusted upwards in order to make a customer sale more likely; when the 




























































































In this process the spread widens when the inventory comes close to its 
boundaries on either side. This, thirdly, implies that the dealer has a 
preferred inventory position to which he intends to move back when de­
parting from it. This position is not related to the underlying security’s 
value but solely dependent on the variability of the order arrival process. 
The spread depends positively on the deviation of the security inventory 
from its preferred level. This result follows from the assumption o f the 
presence of the above mentioned predefined upper and lower bounds of 
permissible inventory levels.- The inventory’s role in this model is that 
of a buffer.
Interestingly, while the spread in Garman reflected the dealer’s effort 
to reduce his failure probability in this model, with its given exogenous 
inventory boundaries, it is the result of the dealer’s effort to maximize 
profits and thus reflects his market power.
The inventory model approaches described so far were statistical in 
nature. Characterizing the market orders as stochastic processes allowed 
to analyze how the market as a whole functions when resolving the clear­
ing problem of disequilibrium situations. Isolating the order flows from 
individual market participants’ trading intentions provided a possibility 
to focus more closely on how the market clearing mechanism (i.e. the 
price setter) interacts with the behavior of the order flow.
Yet, in order to give a more realistic characterization of the dealer’s 
trading activity several other elements should be included in the descrip­
tion of his optimization problem. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981), 
for example, model the dealer’s activity as necessarily involving a portfo­
lio risk, and they thus depart from the order-based analysis. Stoll (1978) 
was the first to develop this intuition. His market maker is a trader 
like others in the market who is willing to change his optimal portfo­
lio composition in order to supply immediacy services to other market 
participants. Being risk averse he faces a cost in offering such a service 
for which he, therefore, asks a compensation. Ho and Stoll (1981) ex­




























































































framework to a multiperiod model with stochastic order flow in order to 
address the intertemporal role of inventory.
Another element which should be included is the special feature of 
security markets that specialists there face both, market orders and limit 
book orders. Zabel (1981) and O ’Hara and Oldfield (198C) incorporate 
this element in their research. Furthermore, they both employ a discrete­
time multiperiod framework and depart also with this characteristic from 
the modeling approaches described previously, e.g. the continuous-time 
multiperiod model of Amihud and Mendelson.36 This new framework 
with prices being called out at the beginning of each period allows to 
incorporate the realistic feature that traders can ’’ hit a quote” by sub­
mitting an order. The dealer has to support his price by trading for 
his own account on demand. Extending the horizon infinitely but di­
viding each trading day in a finite number of periods allows also for the 
inclusion of an overnight market where trade settlement can take place 
independently of order processing.- Subsequent research of Admati and 
Pfleiderer (1989), Easley and O ’Hara (1992), and Suvanto (1993) should 
continue to use this timing convention.
In the following we will describe in more detail Zabel’s approach 
since it is his model that Suvanto then will translate to the institutional 
specifics of the spot foreign exchange market. The model applied in the 
research of this paper will build on Suvanto.
Zabel assumes that a price-maker, like other market participants, is 
basically interested in his own returns. He therefore chooses prices that 
maximize his profit subject to his specific market environment. The 
specialist’s horizon consists in an infinite number of trading days where 
every single trading day is divided into a finite number of trading peri­
ods. Prices are announced at the beginning of each period. All trades 
happening in this period have to be executed at the announced price; 
the specialist has to absorb any potential excess demand that may oc­
36Two other discrete-time models of dealer behavior has been developed by Brad- 




























































































cur among current limit orders on the book and market orders arriving 
in this period. Market and limit orders are assumed to be generated 
by stationary random processes. They are linear in price with additive 
random disturbance terms. While the random disturbance of market or­
ders is learned only after a price is chosen the book is observed at the 
beginning of each period containing the current observation of the limit 
orders’ disturbance as its state. In the last period of every trading day 
the specialist occurs overnight charges on his inventory holdings. Ex­
pected profits are then maximized over an infinite horizon, prices and 
spread being the choice variables.
It turns out that the optimal spread is independent of the specialist’s 
inventory and of the period of the day. It depends only on current period 
limit order variables responding to periodic opportunities available in 
the limit order book.- Dividing the discussion of the outcome into two 
parts, results with and without the presence of the limit order book, 
the following can be observed: In the absence of the limit order book 
the choice of optimal prices and the spread become separate activities. 
Prices are chosen such as to adjust the inventory towards an equilibrium 
level and, after that, to adjust prices themselves in the direction of a 
competitive equilibrium price at which expected excess demand equals 
zero. The spread, on the other hand, is chosen such as to maximize the 
expected return on the spread. It causes shifts in the equilibrium prices 
but the above described process of price adjustment is not influenced by 
this. Interestingly, it can be shown that the optimal spread is identical to 
the single period monopoly spread. The expected return is independent 
of the period, the book, and the inventory position.
In the presence of a limit order book additional opportunities for gains 
are given. While the spread once more is given by the solution to a single 
period maximization problem it is now, additionally, also dependent on 
current information contained in the book and can thus vary with the 
information available. Moreover, the choice of the spread now interacts 




























































































here: The specialist still intends to adjust his inventory position towards 
an equilibrium, but at the same time he wants to maximize his spread 
income and capital gains. The outcome of these conflicting motives is an 
increase in price variances as compared to the case without limit orders.
The complex multiperiod framework of Zabel (1981) is able to identify 
the different roles of the dealer’s choice variables spread and prices and 
the impact of the presence of limit orders. A surprising new finding 
is the myopic character of the spread determination and its invariance 
with respect to the inventory position. Prices, instead, are sensitive to 
inventory, period, and length of the horizon. Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) had shown a similar price adjustment rule, but in their framework 
the spread depended on the deviation of the security inventory from its 
preferred level. This outcome, however, was a direct consequence of the 
assumption of exogenously given limits of permissible inventory levels.
With its discrete time set-up and the assumption of finite periods 
for each trading day Zabel’s model could be considered a suitable frame­
work to be employed for a description o f the spot foreign exchange market 
where quotations are called out before transactions take place aiid posi­
tions have to be closed by the end of a trading day. But in Zabel’s model 
the dealer faces an order flow which consists of both, market and limit 
orders. This feature is highly characteristic for the securities market but 
it is not applicable to the foreign exchange market where brokers are 
the only market participants who accept limit orders. Furthermore, the 
dealer in the Zabel model maximizes utility over an infinite time horizon 
which implies an open inventory liquidation date. A trader’s horizon in 
the spot foreign exchange market, instead, is given by the end of every 
current trading day.
It is Suvanto (1993) who applies a discrete time multiperiod set-up to 
the spot foreign exchange market. In contrast to Stoll (1978) and Ho and 
Stoll (1981) he separates the modeling of the trader’s dynamic pricing 
behavior from the supply side aspects. While holding cost considerations 




























































































ply behavior his optimal pricing policy is dependent on price-sensitive 
stochastic customer orders and inventory considerations. In the follow­
ing we shall concentrate on the description of Suvanto’s model of pricing 
behavior and position adjustment since this is the framework in which 
our research is constructed.
Suvanto is looking at a risk-neutral monopolist trader who is max­
imizing expected revenue over a single trading day. Maximization is 
subject to the constraint that his expected position of foreign exchange 
is closed at the end of the day (or meets some other exogenously given 
target). This condition can be interpreted as a requirement of zero net 
sales over the period under consideration, i.e. a trading day in this case. 
The trader is facing transactions uncertainty since buy and sell orders 
are stochastic. The rationale for this construction is that in a discrete 
time setting the trader sets prices every period in advance and customers 
then decide whether to buy or to sell at the quoted prices and which 
quantities to transact.
Net sales thus become stochastic. The maximization problem is for n 
periods with a finite horizon; information is assumed to be perfect on the 
current state. This results in an optimal spread that is independent of 
the inventory position (i.e. the state of the system) and remains, hence, 
constant through all periods. Its level maximizes the one-period return 
on the equilibrium volume of trade. Ask and bid prices, on the other 
hand, contain the current inventory position as an argument and can be 
decomposed in two parts: One part consists in the one-period equilibrium 
quotation that remains equal through all periods; the other part contains 
the difference between current inventory position and target level as its 
argument and thus causes a dynamic adjustment of prices which directs 
the expected inventory level gradually towards its desired level. Hence, a 
long currency position in early periods leads to a downward adjustment 
of prices during later periods of the trading day.
However, for the dealer it is not optimal to return immediately to 




























































































period and another since large price adjustments are generally revenue 
reducing. Under the condition that transaction disturbances are seri­
ally uncorrelated the optimal pricing rule implies constant quotations 
for subsequent periods after the occurrence of an unexpected shift in 
the position. Thus, expected quotations do not differ between periods 
which implies that customers have no reason to postpone transactions 
in expectancy of better future prices. Information-arbitrage efficiency is 
therefore guaranteed with this kind of dealer pricing behavior.
As for price fluctuations the dealer’s behavior implies a reduced volatil­
ity compared to a situation where he would try to immediately return 
to a closed position after an unexpected shift in the position. The pric­
ing rule’s smoothening effect on price variations thus reflects the buffer 
stock property of inventories which was already identified by Amihud 
and Mendelson (1980).
Suvanto’s results can be extended to a horizon of any length, i.e. any 
number of trading days, as long as the condition of a closed end-of-the- 
day position remains satisfied. In the case of new information arriving on 
future net customer demand price quotations are already affected today. - 
Suvanto also considers the case of the dealer having private information 
on the sequence of customer orders during the day. In this situation the 
information becomes fully reflected in the shadow price for the position 
constraint. In contrast to transactions uncertainty the arrival of new 
information has an immediate, not dampened effect on prices: They 
jump immediately and fully in the direction necessitated by the new 
information. Consequently, volatility augments more strongly than is 
the case with transactions uncertainty.
The results of Suvanto’s model resemble the ones of Zabel (1981) in 
that the spread is independent of the inventory level or even its expected 
change, and that it reflects the monopoly power of the dealer. Prices, 
instead, are inventory dependent and are chosen such as to balance cus­
tomer orders. Once again, this pricing rule resembles the one developed 




























































































the predetermined inventory boundaries.
The similarities of Suvanto’s results to those of the securities mar­
ket literature should not be surprising since the foreign exchange market 
resembles the securities market in many respects. Suvanto’s model is sim­
pler though in that it uses less technical and institutional assumptions. 
He justifies this arguing that limit orders, return uncertainty, agents’ 
perceptions of the true price of an asset, and asymmetric information are 
less important for the behavior of a spot foreign exchange dealer than 
they are for a stock dealer’s behavior. Price uncertainty, however, is 
included through the end-of-day position constraint. It guarantees that 
the trader’s position does not move too far off the desired path.
Are inventory models appropriate for describing the foreign exchange 
market? To give an empirical answer to this question is difficult since 
in order to formulate any kind of test it is necessary to determine how 
the dealer’s optimal strategy translates into his prices. This is a problem 
of significant complexity. Furthermore, many theoretical results rely on 
specific restrictions on the order arrival process which casts doubt over 
any kind of generalizations. However, one simple prediction of inventory 
models is that due to inventory effects there should be mean reversion in 
security prices observable, simply because a dealer will prefer to sell when 
he is long in inventory and buy when he is short. The evidence on this 
issue is mixed: As for equity markets Madhavan and Smidt (1991) find 
little evidence as do Manaster and Mann (1992) for the futures market. 
But as for the foreign exchange market Lyons (1993) finds evidence for 
the presence of inventory effects.
Lyons (1995) finds evidence of an inventory effect during the course of 
the day in addition to the information effect: when the outstanding po­
sition is large, traders modify their bid and ask prices so as to discourage 
further exposure in that direction.
Summarizing one can say that three main motives for the existence 
of a spread have been identified by the surveyed literature: A ’’ failure” 




























































































the market power of a dealer; and the transaction cost related motive of 
dealer risk aversion. Price movements, on the other hand, are in most 
cases motivated by inventory adjustment considerations. However, an 
important aspect in the price formation process has not been considered 
yet: The interpretation of price information.
4.2.2 Information Based Models
Another important aspect in modeling the behavior of participants in 
financial markets is their treatment of price information. As for the for­
eign exchange market it is more difficult to say what is information than 
it is for the securities market. There assets with some intrinsic value may 
exist about which insiders may have information which is not public, or 
individual analysts have information on individual corporations. How­
ever, already the identity of an agent placing a market order may convey 
important information. Furthermore, the observation of some transac­
tion taking place provides information to other market-makers and may 
alter their own pricing behavior. Also, customers placing orders with 
these market-makers may in turn become affected by this information 
and change their order behavior as well.
Many models make use of probability distributions that generate 
order prices in the market. These order prices can either come from 
stochastic processes exogenous to the market, thus, e.g., creating a ’true’ 
equilibrium price. Or probability models can represent market-makers’ 
subjective believes about prices. It is also possible that tile consensus 
value of a stock given all publicly available information is given by an 
exogenous random value. But investors do not act directly on this value 
but rather on their expectation of it (see Gloston and Milgrom (1985)). 
I.e., objective processes can coexist with subjective beliefs about those 
processes. Such a subjectivization of the pricing process is important for 
the foreign exchange market since it allows for the presence of heteroge­




























































































strive to include this feature since it seems natural to assume heterogene­
ity among market-makers. Flood (1991, p.62) argues that the presence 
o f a big number of market-makers and dealing institutions in the foreign 
exchange interbank market would be superfluous if all participants were 
identical. Also, as was seen above, GDDMOP (1994) find that traders 
have different time horizons and thus exhibit heterogeneity.
Individual market participants may try to refine the parameters of 
their subjective distributions using pieces of new information arriving 
through the trading process. The study of such a learning activity has 
attracted considerable interest since it allows to model the dynamic be­
havior of economic time series under the influence of some form of learn­
ing. Conroy and Winkler (1981), for example, are able to show in a 
Bayesian model how the subjective variances of a market-maker’s sub­
jective distribution changes in the course of the learning process. They 
consider a monopolistic, expected-profit maximizing market-maker who 
faces streams of buy and sell limit orders. The market-maker holds the 
believe that reservation prices of buy and sell orders are generated by 
two independent normal distributions. Given these subjective price dis­
tributions he has to set his optimal spread subject to some inventory 
constraint. Conroy and Winkler are able to show how the subjective 
variances of the market-maker’s subjective distribution shrink when he 
uses Bayesian learning in order to update his price expectations. The 
outcome of this learning process is that the market-maker’s spread be­
comes narrower as learning proceeds.
Bayesian learning usually is applied in contexts where the presence of 
fully rational agents is assumed. This assumption has been put in ques­
tion, however. As is well known, proponents of this critical view claim 
that too much information and sophistication is attributed on the part 
of economic agents to be a realistic description of reality.37 In fact, an 
economic environment may become very complex exactly because of the




























































































highly sophisticated strategies chosen by its agents. This has led inter­
est to analyses that assume ’’ bounded rationality” on the part of agents. 
Agents are assumed to follow simple ’’ rules of thumb” when deciding 
which actions to take. The motivation for this is that the real world 
is too complicated, and market participants do not have the capacity 
to perform the difficult optimization exercises involved in maximizing 
their infinite-horizon payoffs. In the models of this literature agents are 
boundedly rational in their method of forecasting and decision-making. 
In choosing their actions they make use of simple and intuitive rules. 
Their learning behavior is adaptive in that choices are modified over time 
on the basis of observations of past performance.38 While an important 
use for the theory of adaptive learning is that of a selection device for 
situations with multiple solutions in the following we will be interested 
in the dynamic processes of learning themselves - and not only the limit 
points.
The effects of adaptive learning on the behavior of financial time series 
is being studied in a relatively new line of research. Intuitively, adaptive 
learning behavior seems to be a strong candidate for explaining excess 
volatility in financial markets. In fact, many of these learning approaches 
to financial markets, some of which we are going to describe now, observe 
a market which does not really settle down, and often moves through ap­
parent changing regimes.- A couple of papers work within a simple but 
well defined economic framework in which learning is used in order to 
explore both evolutionary and stability properties. Lettau (1997) stud­
ies optimal portfolio decisions of boundedly rational agents. The latter 
trade in a market where they can decide on how much of a risky asset 
to hold in each period. Agents are not able to compute the calculations
38For an introduction to the literature on bounded rationality and adaptive learn­
ing see e.g. Evans and Honkapohja (1992) for a review of macroeconomic models, 
Marimon and McGrattan (1992) for a review of game-theoretic models, the Sympo­
sium: Bounded rationality and learning (1994), and Honkapohja (1993) for a short 




























































































required for expected utility maximization. Instead they learn from ob­
served outcomes of their past investment decisions and revise their next 
period’s portfolio using this observation. The inductive learning process 
is modelled via a genetic algorithm: Parameters of the agents’ strategies 
are encoded into bitstrings; the bitstrings evolve using a genetic algo­
rithm; the selection process is based on utility payoffs from a sequence 
of draws of the random asset. In this behavioral set-up Lettau is able 
to show that agents take decisions that differ from rational equilibrium 
outcomes: Adaptive agents tend to take on too much risk compared to 
rational agents. The size of this risk taking bias is a function of the 
number of market observations used before agents update their invest­
ment portfolio. Under certain conditions it is possible that this bias does 
not vanish as lifetime increases. Furthermore, a response asymmetry can 
be observed: The portfolio adjustment after negative returns is larger 
in absolute value than after positive returns. The continual updating of 
portfolio weights can thus replicate certain data on mutual funds where 
agents are continually changing portfolio composition.
Timmermann (1993) uses learning in a standard efficient market model 
based on a representative agent to explain excess volatility and pre­
dictability in stock prices. Dividends in this model grow at a constant 
rate. The agent makes use of standard least squares techniques in order 
to estimate the dividend growth rate. The intuition for Timmermami’s 
results then is as follows: A higher estimated growth rate compared to 
the ’’ true” one will cause the stock price to be relatively lower. (This is 
true since the stock price is computed as the present value of expected fu­
ture dividends; yet projections for the latter are relatively smaller due to 
the higher estimated growth rate.) The lower stock price implies higher 
dividend yields. Learning effects generate a statistically significant corre­
lation between future stock returns and the dividend yield. This correla­
tion comes through two channels: First, the high dividend yield by itself 
implies a high payoff on stocks. Second, when the estimated growth rate 




























































































will thus be higher than in a model with rational expectations.
As for excess volatility of stock prices Timinermann compares a ratio­
nal expectations model with the learning framework in the aftermath of 
a shock to dividends. In the former the dividend shock will be reflected 
in a proportional shock to the stock price. Learning, on the other hand, 
implies an additional effect on prices since the shock also affects the es­
timated dividend growth rate. However, excess volatility of stock prices 
can only be explained by learning if the sample size is small (n <  10 0 ). 
With an increasing sample size the estimated parameters converge to 
their true value and learning induced volatility of prices declines.
Arifovic (1996) is explicitly addressing volatility of foreign exchange 
rates rather than of stock prices. She examines the relation between 
learning and volatility using an overlapping generations model of ex­
change rate determination in which agents learn via a genetic algorithm. 
It turns out that the learning algorithm can induce exchange rate fluc­
tuations that do not occur under rational expectations. In her model 
agents’ policy decisions about consumption and savings are encoded into 
a bitstring to render them manipulatable by a genetic algorithm. A pop­
ulation of agents is then evolved through time where observed utility 
serves as the selection criterion. Arifovic is able to show that in this 
framework exchange rates do not settle down at any known equilibrium 
but rather continue to bounce around.
Lyons (1991) investigates the role of heterogeneity of traders’ beliefs 
in the foreign exchange market. Novel in his model is that transactions 
per se play an integral part in the expectations updating process. The 
ultimate market equilibrium, therefore, is not the outcome of a one-shot 
trading game, but is achieved only after the market has learned about the 
individual bits of information. The driving force behind this is customer 
business which will continue even if a trader finds himself in the middle 
of the process of learning about others’ information. This continuous 
mediation of transaction requests is a typical feature of the foreign ex­




























































































always has to quote a competitive price oil request). Lyons uses it to 
circumround the no-trade results of earlier research and makes it become 
the linking element between diversity of beliefs, volume, and volatility. 
In his model a greater dispersion of beliefs induces higher trading vol­
ume which in turn induces greater volatility. However, if instead it is 
the greater variability of customer-business rather than the dispersion 
of beliefs which causes higher trading volume then the latter’s effect on 
volatility is ambiguous.
Brock and LeBaron (1995) have traders experiment with different 
belief systems. They employ a two-period competitive equilibrium model 
of trading volume in which traders have a choice of beliefs based upon 
past performance using those beliefs. Traders modify their strategies in 
an adaptive way, but on a time scale that is slower than the one of the 
trading process itself. (Introducing a slow time scale upon which beliefs 
change is like increasing a trader’s probability of staying in a state once 
he is in that state.) On the time scale of the trading process this leads to 
positive autocorrelation in volatility and volume.- As Brock and LeBaron 
point out themselves, a problem with this approach is that a mechanism 
is lacking which makes large enough masses of traders change to similar 
enough strategies. Without such a mechanism the cross sectional law 
of large numbers will cancel out the aggregate effects of such strategy 
diversity.
The paper by Beltratti and Margarita (1992) shows how in an adap­
tive learning environment it is possible that from two groups of more and 
less smart agents the less smart survives in an evolutionary sense. Agents’ 
bilateral trading world is represented in a neural network. Traders meet 
randomly when a price is proposed and decide if their respective valu­
ations are amenable to trade. Agents differ in levels of sophistication 
which can be improved by paying some cost. In this set-up Beltratti and 
Margarita observe fluctuations between the fraction o f smart and dumb 
agents. When the price settles down it no longer pays to be smart, and 




























































































which brings back smart agents.
The above described models all show how the presence of adaptive 
learning behavior leads to outcomes that are different from rational ex­
pectations models. They are able to reproduce certain volatility and 
non-convergence properties known from the empirical evidence in finan­
cial markets. Furthermore, they show the possibility of smartness not 
being selected in an evolutionary sense. In this context it is of inter­
est to look at the results of a series of research by Gode and Sunder 
(1990). They are able show in experiments with artificially intelligent 
and zero intelligent agents that the total surplus of double auction mar­
kets is already extractable by a zero intelligent behavior. Stronger forms 
of individual rationality do not increase the total exploited surplus. Zero 
intelligent agents do only follow the behavioral rule not to pursue trades 
that are known to incur a loss. They have no power to observe, learn, 
or remember, and they do not try to maximize profits. They converge 
to the proximity of the unique equilibrium price. However, this process 
takes longer as it does with human or artificially intelligent traders and 
implies more price volatility. Furthermore, they cause the total profits to 
be distributed across traders in a less even manner. In obtaining these 
results natural selection plays no role.
Gode and Sunder attribute these striking findings to the structure 
of double-auction markets. It is the rules of that trading system which 
causes allocative efficiency independently of agents’ behavior. Gode and 
Sunder (1997) pursue this intuition theoretically in the affirmative.
While Gode and Sunder’s work is not explicitly dealing with the 
learning behavior of agents it is interesting to see it in the context of 
evolutionary models in which rationality is not selected for in the evolu­
tionary process (see e.g. Blume and Easley (1992) and as a special case 
DeLong et al. (1992)). In the research of this and our subsequent paper 
which introduces competition we will compare different behavioral rules 
of learning which can be assigned to different degrees of rationality. We 




























































































learning extract a higher surplus than agents with significantly more effi­
cient learning behavior. This result is not only able to explain persistent 
volatility behavior in financial markets but it explains also why over the 
long-run adaptive learning is not outperformed in an evolutionary sense 
by more efficient learning behavior. The results suggest furthermore that 
it is not necessary to assume bounded rationality on behalf of the agents; 
rather it can be a rational choice to adopt a learning behavior that would 
be classified lowest in a menu of various levels of rationality.
The subsequent work is organized in the following way: The model 
of a monopolistic trader is presented in the next section. The intro­
duction of learning necessitates the application of simulations which are 
introduced next. They allow to investigate the role of the model’s dif­
ferent parameters, of the learning rules applied, and of a change in the 
institutional setting.
5 Modelling the Trader as a Monopolist
5.1 The One-Period Model
The one-period model is presented in a fairly detailed way in order to 
help the reader understand the setting to which the various modifications 
will be applied in later sections. The foreign exchange dealer as described 
here finds himself in the fortunate position of being a monopolist in his 
market. He is facing a flow demand for and a flow supply of foreign 
currency. Customers are sensitive to the price of foreign currency. Its 
price s, the exchange rate, is the price of one unit of foreign currency in 
terms of domestic currency.
However, there are two different types of customers present in the 
market: One type is characterized by a high elasticity of net-supply, the 
other type by a low elasticity, all other parameters being equal between 




























































































period t, x t, can be described as follows: 
i f  =  a — c • s“ ; 
x[ =  a — d ■ s“ , c >  d,
with sa being the monopolist’s ask-rate and the intercept a being equal 
for both types. The superscripts indicate which type’s demand is being 
described. The parameters c and d stand for the types’ respective sen­
sitivity to exchange rates. Seen from the dealer’s perspective, customer 
demand is the same as arriving sell orders.
If the number of low elasticity type costumers in the market is given 
by 1 — v, and the number of high elasticity type costumers by v, then 
total market demand is given by:
x t =  v ■ [a — cs“] +  (1  — v) ■ [a -  d.s"].
It should be noticed that the demand function does not represent always 
present market orders but rather average arrival rates of incoming orders. 
These arrival rates are determined by some exogenous macroeconomic 
environment.
As for the supply side of the market, there are similarly two types 
of clients present in the market, high and low elasticity ones. Their two 
different arrival rates of foreign currency supply in period t, yt, arc as 
follows:
yt =  b +  c - s bt;
y[ =  b +  d ■ sbt. c  >  d,
with sb being the dealer’s bid-rate, the intercept b again being equal for 
both types, and c and d representing the two types’ respective sensitivity 
to exchange rates. Customer supply is arriving buy orders from the 
dealer’s perspective. Assuming the same distribution of high and low 
elasticity costumers as for the demand side total market supply is then 
represented by:




























































































High values of the shift variable a indicate a high level of demand; high 
values of 6 a high level of supply. It is assumed that a — b >  0, which 
guarantees that in equilibrium, both, the price and the volume of trade 
are positive.
At the beginning of each period t (i.e. o f each trading session) the 
dealer, in his position as a market, maker, receives a phone call during 
which he is asked to quote bid- and ask-rates. If the customer decides to 
sell or buy at the quoted prices the transaction will take place. Note that 
market demand and supply functions correspond to the monopolist’s ex­
pectations about their respective average levels. In order for equilibrium 
to hold expectations have to be correct on average, but not at every sin­
gle moment of time. The quantities the dealer buys, yt. and sells, x t, are 
denominated in foreign currency per unit of time.
In order to describe the dealer’s maximization problem the ask- and 
the bid-rate are redefined in terms of the mid-rate and the half-spread: 
The mid-rate is given by st =  [s“ +  sj’j /2 , and the half-spread by zt — 
js“ — sjj /2 . Revenue per trading session is given by the difference be­
tween the value of sales and the value of purchases:
Rt =  x t -sat - y t - sb,
Rt =  X f  [st +  2(] -  yt ■ [s( -  zt] .
The revenue is defined in terms of domestic currency. Note that [,s( +  zt\ 
equals sa and [s( — 2,] is equal to sb. Rewriting the revenue expression 
in the following way:
Rt =  Z f  [xt +  yt] +  st ■ [x t -  yt] ,
it can be seen more easily that the dealer’s income is equal to the spread 
times the volume of trade adjusted for any cash in- or outflow stemming 
from net sales or purchases of foreign currency.
It is assumed that the dealer is aware of there being two different 




























































































and supply functions, i.e. all the respective parameters are known to him. 
However, the dealer has no information about the distribution of high and 
low elasticity clients, i.e. the value of the parameter v is unknown to him. 
For his maximization calculus he therefore has to use his subjective prior 
belief q about the true value v: The subjective belief qt is the belief the 
trader holds at the beginning of period t conditional on all information 
available up to that point of time.
Furthermore, the dealer is constrained to have his expected foreign 
exchange position closed by the end of the day, or to meet some other 
position target m*. A position is said to be closed (squared) if the value 
of assets denominated in a given currency is equal the value of liabilities 
denominated in that currency; i.e. the dealer’s holdings of foreign curren­
cies are hedged against any unexpected change in the environment which 
determines the customers’ average buy and sell orders. Since for every 
foreign exchange transaction there are always two currencies involved a 
dealer’s position can be regarded as closed if net sales o f these two curren­
cies are equal to zero by the end of the trading day (or whatever period 
under consideration).
Apart from risk considerations the constraint ensures that the trader 
will be able to stay in the market over successive periods of trade. If 
the trader were to do net sales only (which an unconstrained maximiza­
tion implies) he would loose the possibility to buy foreign currency from 
his customers and therefore the possibility to make future profits. The 
change in the trader’s foreign currency inventory, m, during one trading 
session can be described by the amount of net sales of that period:
mt -  mt+i = x t -  i/t,
where mt is the inventory at the beginning of period t, and mt+i is the 
inventory at the beginning of period t +  1 (which is the same as the 
inventory at the end of period t).




























































































constraint that expected net sales are equal to zero:
M ax Et (nt) =  [g, • x? +  (1 -  qt) ■ i ' ]  • s“ -  [g( • yth +  (1  -  qt) • 3/'] • sbt
=  [g< ■ (a -  cs1) +  (1  -  qt) ■ (a -  ds“ )] • (s, +  zt) -
[g, • (b +  csty +  (1  — g<) • (b +  d.sf)j • (st — zt)
s.t. 0 =  E (x t) -  E (yt).
Simplifying the expected profit function and using the following conven­
tions: A =  a — 6 >  0, B =  a +  b >  0 .6 =  2c > 0 ,7  =  2d >  0, the problem 
can be rewritten as:
M ax Et (7Tt) — qt • • St B  • Zt — 6 • -1- z f^j -f-
(1 — gi) • [a  ■ st +  B ■ zt — 7  ■ (*? +  2(2)]
s.t. 0 =  mt -  mt+1 -  A +  qt ■ 6st +  (1 -  gt) • 7 st.
The profit maximizing mid-rate and spread result to be:
A
qtb +  (1 — qt) 7
________ B________
^  2 • (qt6 +  (1  -  gt) 7 ) ’
It can be seen that the dealer’s equilibrium mid-rate will be the lower 
the more HET he believes to be in the market fqt is bigger than (1 — gt) 
so that the relative bigger value of gets a bigger weight than 7 ). The 
equilibrium spread shows to be even more sensitive to the believed in 
distribution of clients. On the other hand, when demand is high (high a 
implies high A and high B) the mid-rate will be high and the spread wide. 




























































































to a lower mid-rate but again to a high spread. This reveals the twofold 
character of a trader’s business: On the one hand he responds to clients’ 
demand for and supply of foreign currency which he tries to balance with 
his quotations; on the other hand he provides a liquidity service for which 
he asks a certain price, the spread. The fact that the spread increases 
with B. the volume of trade, reflects the trader’s monopoly position in 
the market.
5.2 The n-Period Dynamic Model
We now look at a monopolist dealer who tries to maximize his trading 
income over a whole trading day. In order to imitate real trading condi­
tions we assume that the trader hats to have a closed position, m*, at the 
end of the day. This does not apply to the single trading sessions during 
the day, however. The constraint forces the dealer not to simply maxi­
mize his profits in each period, but to keep also an eye on his position 
and to adjust the quotations if necessary: In case of a non-zero inventory 
the trader will quote a rate different from the equilibrium one in order 
to attract net sales.- A trading day consists o f T  trading sessions where 
T  is given exogenously.
The trader’s dynamic optimization problem can be formulated in the 
following way:
Jt [mt] 
J t  [m T]
m +i 
Et (ttit)
=  M ax Et { 7T( -I- J,+i [m(+i]} (value function)
=  0 (terminal value)
=  mt — A +  qt ■ 6 ■ st -f (1  — qt) • 7  • s t (system constraint) 
=  m*(terminal state constraint),
where t =  0 ,1 ,..., T  — 1 . The profit function is given by:
fit — Qi ' [A • st +  B ■ zt — 6 ■ (s2 +  +




























































































The value function Jt [m(] gives the expected profit from moment t 
until the end of the day when optimal control is applied at each future 
moment t + 1 , t +  2, T  — 1 . The terminal value Jt [nij] is equal to zero 
since no cost is attached to the possible open position at the end of the 
day.
The sequential pricing rule can now be derived by solving first the 
optimal quotation for the last period (T — l .T )  and then proceeding 
recursively backward in time 39. The resulting optimal quotation for 




qt6 +  (1  -  qt) 7  qt6 +  (1  -  qt) 7
_________B________
2 • {q t6 +  (1 — q t) 7)
{nit - m , ) / ( T -  t ) .
Whereas the spread changes only with the different beliefs of each period 
and otherwise remains constant at the level that maximizes the one- 
period return the mid-rate is being adjusted in each period in order to 
steer the position: The dealer quotes in such a way that he can expect 
to close a fraction 1 / (T  — t) of the eventual open position during the 
current and the remaining trading sessions of the day. The mid-rate 
will be below the equilibrium rate if the current inventory positions falls 
short of the target, and it will be above in the opposite case. Note that 
the coefficient attached to the open position increases as t approaches 
the last trading session T. As in the static model mid-rate and spread 
depend negatively on the trader’s belief of the fraction of high elasticity 
clients present in the market.
In this optimal pricing policy the belief which the trader holds plays 
a significant role. In subsequent periods he will therefore try to improve 
the quality of his belief through a continuous learning process. It is this 
process with subsequent updating of beliefs we are going to look at now.






























































































In order to effectively maximize his objective function the trader has to 
use the indirect evidence from the order flow to infer what the value of 
the parameter is he does not know. The learning problem is then solved 
via the application of a specific learning rule.
Within this model we specify as the information the trader receives 
a client’s reaction to his quoted price. At the beginning of each trading 
session the trader quotes his bid- and ask-rate upon request. When his 
quotation gets hit by a client the trader knows that a low elasticity client 
had been calling. This is true since all the four demand and supply curves 
are known to the trader, and since the expected demand and supply 
curves always lie above the low elasticity type’s respective curves. I.e.: 
The optimal quotation will always be too high for the high elasticity type. 
After the observation of the outcome of the phone call the trader, at the 
end of each period, updates his prior belief according to some updating 
rule. The resulting posterior then becomes his new prior. Observing new 
data in the following periods the updating process continues.
The choice of the updating rule is of considerable importance since 
the movement of beliefs over time is determined by it. The dynamics of 
the updating process and its convergence properties will be reflected in 
the movement of prices. Hence, knowing those properties of the learning 
rule allows to determine what aspects of price behavior follow from the 
nature of the learning rule, and which reflect other factors such as dealer- 
specific preferences or market structure constraints.
While all asymmetric-information microstructure models essentially 
solve a Bayesian learning model we propose here the application of less 
sophisticated learning rules. The reason for this procedure is that the 
chaotic and volatile behavior of intra-day exchange rates together with 
the negligible impact of news of minor importance (see Stylized Fact 6 ) 
suggest the possibility of a less smooth learning process on behalf of the 




























































































learning rules does not necessarily imply a lower level of rationality. This 
argument is relevant in the context of a market where professional traders 
try to optimize their behavior in order to extract maximal profits.
Following the taxonomy of learning of Milgrom and Roberts (1991) 
we will make use of ’unsophisticated learning’ behavior as opposed to 
’sophisticated learning’ . The rules associated with this type of learning 
are ’adaptive learning’ rules. I.e.: Individuals take decisions on the basis 
o f past observations only. 40 We will concentrate on this type of learning 
behavior in the following and present three specific updating rules that 
fall into the class of adaptive learning behavior. The order of presenta­
tion is not by chance; the learning rules are chosen such as to require a 
decreasing level of sophistication.
5.3.1 Fictitious Play
Fictitious play is a well known type of adaptive learning behavior. While 
originally introduced as a method of solving normal form games 41 it later 
on became applied in modeling learning processes.42 Its mathematical 
method is rather intuitive and simple: Taking the empirical frequencies of 
opponents’ past strategies agents are supposed to learn about the future 
choices of their opponents. Translating this concept into the context of 
our model the updating algorithm, basically, is of the following shape:
Prob(Acpt)(T  +  1) =  y^jAcptt)/T,
t
40Mi!grom and Roberts (1991) define adaptive in the sense that every strategy 
played by a player must not violate a minimum rationality requirement with respect 
to opponents’ previous play. A sophisticated player, on the other hand, would also 
be forward-looking by anticipating his opponents’ past behavior.
41See Brown (1951), Robinson (1951).
42For examples of applications see e.g. Fudenberg-Kreps (1993 a.1995). However, 
they justify ficticious play in terms of Bavsean learning (Fudenberg-Kreps (1993)) 




























































































where Acpt refers to a client’s acceptance of the quote. In words: The 
probability of next period’s customer being a LET type is equal to the 
sum of all acceptances up until now over the total number of periods.43
Being backward-looking only an important characteristic of this learn­
ing rule is its long memory: The set of all past events is perfectly recalled 
and influences each new probability calculation. The longer history lasts 
the less weight a single new event attains. This leads to a smoothen- 
ing of the series of frequencies over time. In the limit, as T  —► oc the 
Prob(Acpt)(T) converges to the true parameter value v.
5.3.2 Evolutionary Play
Evolutionary play is a theoretical approach that is being used for prob­
lems of equilibrium selection and justification in games. Typically, evolu­
tionary models are not considered as describing proper learning processes 
since no specific learning rule is introduced. Yet. through the evolution­
ary process some sort of learning is taking place.44 In the context of 
adaptive learning it has to be noticed, however, that in evolutionary 
models opponents change at each stage which renders the record of past 
plays non-homogenous.
In an environment of evolutionary learning agents typically are self- 
interested but myopic; i.e. they have a short-horizon in pursuing their ol>- 
jectives. Players are matched randomly. This implies that they have no 
knowledge about the characteristics of their opponents. Therefore,their 
actions are best replies against the distribution of the population’s strate­
gies rather than that of a single opponent. However, this behavior can 
be interpreted as a way of formalizing beliefs on the opponent’s strategy. 
Finally, players can mutate over time. I.e. that they can either be sulr- 
ject to random changes, or they can be replaced by members of a new
43An explicit specification of initial move properties is omitted here, but will be 
dealt with in the simulation part.
44For a discussion of the connections between learning and evolution see Selten 




























































































generation who, not having played before, randomize their strategies.
Kandori-Mailath-Rob (1993) present a 2x2 normal form game which 
incorporates the above described features in an evolutionary framework. 
They are able to show that if the game has a unique dominant strategy 
then it is globally stable,- even in a dynamic context in which agents’ 
rationality is limited. As for convergence to equilibrium Ellison (1993) 
shows that when the number of elements in a population is high, and 
individuals have played the game for a sufficiently large number of pe­
riods, fast coordination about the risk dominant equilibrium should be 
expected on their part. As for the evolution of the system the work of 
Ellison demonstrates that the speed of convergence to the steady state is 
higher in local vs. global interaction. This is due to the higher probability 
of being matched with players that are similar to previous matches.
How are we going to apply evolutionary learning to our model? We 
will have the monopolist make use of different updating rules the success 
of which he compares via the profit they make after a given sequence of 
periods. While playing a mixed strategy comparisons of success are done 
between hypothetical pure strategies (i.e. results of strategies are com­
pared by looking at the hypothetical outcomes when either of the two 
strategies would have been played purely). According to the relative suc­
cess of the two strategies relative weights will be adjusted subsequently 
for the next sequence of plays. Increments of adjustment are given.
The two strategies the trader will make use of are fictitious play and 
simplistic learning (which will be described in the following section); 
i.e. the most and the least sophisticated learning rules on our scale are 
going to play against each other. Convergence should occur if one of the 
strategies is dominant. The speed of convergence depends on the change 
of weights given to each strategy. However, if the change is too rapid the 
end of game could be reached too quickly, i.e. before one strategy really 
has proven to be fitter in the long-run.
In the case of competition not one trader will apply different rules of 




























































































respectively. According to the groups’ success members will then switch 
to another group.
5.3.3 Simplistic Learning
The third learning rule we introduce is the least sophisticated one. In 
fact, the rule reveals little insight on behalf of an agent in a learning pro­
cess’ sensitivity to the degree of adjustments being used in the updating 
process. It is for this reason that we call it ’’ simplistic” . It is introduced 
here as a reference point at the lower end of the scale of sophistication.
The simplistic rule simply says, depending on the last observation, 
to adjust one’s belief half the distance between the belief currently held 
and the maximum (minimum) parameter value possible. I.c.:
To be more specific, if in our model the trader meets a high elasticity 
type (HET) (=no deal took place) he increases q1} his subjective prior 
belief about the fraction of HET in the market, by
, 1 - 0 1
92 — <7i A-----2—
_  9i +  1 .
2 ’
if he met a low elasticity type (LET) he decreases q\ such that
The same happens at the end o f each period.
It is obvious that with this learning behavior belief revisions take place 
in relatively big jumps. With a series of equal observations (i.e. accep­
tances or rejections only) beliefs quickly adjust towards the respective 
extreme points. One contrasting observation, instead, makes the new 
belief immediately jump to the vicinity of the opposite extreme. This 




























































































extreme point. While giving such a big weight to the last observation 
renders this learning process extremely volatile and 11011-convergent its 
expected value, however, converges to the true parameter value:
E M  =  v - ( £ ± )  +  £ r 1
\imE (qt) =  v . 1- ^ r  +  ^ - = v.
2
After having introduced the three rules of updating that will be used 
in the following we are now going to implement the simplistic one in our 
model.
5.4 An Explicit Solution For A  Three-Period Model 
W ith Belief Updating
A specification of the belief updating process is necessary in order to 
solve explicitly the above presented n-period model. This is done here 
using the simplistic updating rule as an example.45 In order to keep com­
putations tractable the time horizon is limited to three periods. Subject 
to the different possible phone call outcomes in each period there are four 
possible new believes r/3:
• If in the previous period 92 =
93 =  i f  a H E T called;
93 =   ̂ i f  a LET called.4
• If in the previous period qo =
93 =  i f  a H E T  called;
93 =  ~  i f  a LET called.
4





























































































As was shown in section 1.2 the general mid-rate solution for the 
n-period optimization problem is given by:
st =  —7 — 77------ 7---------- 7— 77-------r— (m t -  m ‘t+l) / (T  -  t ) .
9,<5 + ( l - q t)7 <7,<5 + (l-<?,)7 v + l '
If assumingly a trading day consists of three trading sessions. T =  3. 
the quotient (T  — t) will take the values 3,2,1 through periods 1 to 3. 
The new inventory position at the end of any period is equal to the 
position at the beginning of the period minus net-sales of foreign currency, 
where the inventory position at the beginning of the period in turn is 
given by last period’s initial inventory position minus net-sales and so 
forth. Following this structure m3 will be given by:
m3 =  m2 -  [A +  q2 ■ 6s2 +  (1 -  92) • 7 S2]
where m2 is equal to
A
m 2 =  m* +  A -  6 • --------r -
916 +  ( 1 - 9 i )7
and
1 /I 1 £ j
q26 +  (1  -  9 2 ) 7
Substituting these expressions in m3 one obtains:
m3 =  m* +  2A — fi ■
l  A______ 2_|______
<7i($ +  (l - 9 1 ) 7
and consequently for s3:
A -f- S _____^ -----+  0 .?■* + ( l-gih
q2f> 4- (1 -  fft) 7
S3 =
2 A - 6 - _i_a
_i±_91 A + ( I —«/! )7
<73<̂ + (1 -93)7
A ■ [ -  {qx6 +  (1 -  9 1) 7 ) • {q26 +  (1 -  92) 7 ) +  1
6 (q 26 +  (1 -  92) 7 ) +  |fl(9 i<$ +  (1 -  9 1) 7 ) +  \t>2] J
[936 +  ( 1 - 93) 7 ) • (9i<5 +  (1 -  9 1) 7 ) • (q2& +  (1 -  92) 7 ]'
With this explicit expression for the 3rd period’s mid-rate it is now pos­




























































































Analysis of Variance Depending on which clients will have called the 
dealer’s 3rd period subjective belief 93 may take four different realizations 
as was shown above, and his quotations will differ accordingly. In order 
to assess the quotations’ variability and compare it with the fundamen­




where 9  is the expected value of 93.
The unconditional variance of 93, V  (93), is given by:
-i2
V( q3).
V  (93) =  —  v w  16 2<7i  +  9 i +  5
if in the previous period 92 =  and if in the previous period 92 =  
y  (9 3 )  =  —  ■ [291  +  9 i  +  2 ]  •
Both variances are changing with 9 1. Their possible numerical values 
range from 0.3125 to 0.59375 in the first case and from 0.125 to 0.3125 in 
the second case (for values for 91 of 0 and 1, respectively). The variance 
o f the fundamentals (F) on the other hand is given by the variance of 
the slopes, which follow a binomial distribution, and can be computed 
easily:
V  (F)  =  v • [c — vc — (1 — v) d]2 +  (1 — v) ■ [d — vc — (1 — v) d]2 
— (v — v2) ■ (d — c)2.
As for proving the presence of excess volatility it has to be shown that 
V  («3) >  V  (F ) .  Plugging in and simplifying the respective expressions 
we get:
(v ~ y2) ■ [93<̂  +  (1 ~ 93) 7]4 ■ M  +  (1 — 9i) 7]2 ■ M  +  (1 -  92) 7]2 y .  s 
A2 { - [ 9 i<5 +  (1 - 9 1) 7 ] • [92*5 +  (1 - 92) 7 ] +  <5[92<5 +  (1 - 92) 7 ] +<52} 2 ^
Simulations show that for values realistically small for 6 and 7  excess 





























































































6.1 The Simulation Set-up
All the simulations throughout the paper have been programmed in 
MATLAB. The dynamic simulation system consists of three or six peri­
ods which make for one trading day, respectively. In order to analyze the 
system’s sensitivity with respect to its parameter a single trading day 
model is being simulated. When analyzing convergence behavior in the 
long run and comparing different learning rules the system is simulated 
over many trading days.
The model’s parameters, intercept, demand and supply sensitivities, 
and the true distribution of the population, are given specific values at the 
beginning of each program. Also a value for the trader’s subjective prior 
belief is specified. (The system’s sensitivity to these parameters’s values 
is analyzed in the following section.) For the first period the program 
then computes the optimal mid-rate, spread, and the resulting inventory. 
At the end of period 1 the program generates the two possible updates of 
the initial belief. For both possibilities mid-rate, spread, and inventory 
are then computed for period 2. The procedure is repeated for the third 
period where now four different beliefs are potential. All different belief 
histories are traced back in a matrix, and the respective probabilities 
o f occurrence are assigned. This allows the program to compute the 
different variances at the end o f each trading day. Finally, the variance 
of the fundamentals is computed which allows to compare volatilities and 
to determine the degree of excess volatility.
6.2 Volatility Behavior under Changing Parameter 
Values
In the simulations of this section it is investigated how the variance and 




























































































look at the quotations’ variance as well as at the fundamentals’ variance. 
As for the computation of the quotations’ variance we chose the variance 
between all possible third period quotations. Although in every third 
period only one realization is observable the chosen statistic reports the 
variability between all possible observations of a given third period and 
can such be seen as an indicator of the variability between observable 
third period quotations over many trading days. In a following paper 
which deals with competition it will be seen how this variability changes 
with an increasing number of traders.
While for the simulations of many trading days different learning rules 
are used and compared for the single day setting the parameters’ impact 
has been analyzed for one learning rule only: the simplistic learning 
rule. One reason for this choice is that a frequentalist’s approach or 
evolutionary play are more meaningful for an extended number of trading 
days. The other is that the size of the single day’s variance does not 
differ much with different learning rules. A short example will give an 
idea about the size of the differences:
E xam ple 1  With fictitious play and assuming a prior of zero the result­
ing possible third period beliefs are: 2 /3 , 1/3, 1/3, 0, and the. respective 
quotations are. given by: 2, 2.5, 2.5. 3.33. The unconditional variance of 
all possible last period quotations is then equal to V  — 0.24 (assuming a 
true, distribution of the. population o f v =  0.4/.
With simplistic learning, on the. other hand, and assuming the same 
prior the resulting possible third period beliefs are: 3 /4, 1/4, 1/2, 0, and 
the quotations are equal to 2.22, 3.33. 1.95, 2.66 which yields a variance 
of V  =  0.30. Changing the simplistic learner’s prior to a value of 0.5, 
instead, yields a variance o fV  =  0.21.
The example shows that, depending on the prior, the variance can 
be smaller or bigger with simplistic learning as compared to fictitious 
play. But in all cases it is considerably higher than the fundamentals’ 




























































































values that has been used in the foregoing calculations).- For the following 
simulations simplistic learning has been chosen as the rule of updating 
with a prior of q 1 =  0.5.
For ease of comprehension all results are presented graphically and 
then described. As a convention the mid-rates’ variance is presented as 
a solid line, the fundamentals’ one as a dashed line.
While varying one parameter’s value the values of all other parameters 
are held fixed at the following levels:
a =  2. d =  1.2, g =  0.6, v =  0.4, q\ =  0.5.
The Impact of the Size of the Intercept A
Observation 1 The variance of the mid-rate is continuously increasing 
in the intercept A.
In the present setting the quotation's variance is always higher than 
the fundamental’s one. Excess volatility is thus always present and 
growing in A.
In this simulation the intercept is taking on values between 1 and 5. 
The variance of the fundamentals can be seen as the horizontal line at 
the value 0.021C. Since it is not dependent on the intercept it remains 
invariable. The variance of all possible third period quotations in turn 
is continuously increasing in A. Already at its initial value of 1 it is 
exceeding the fundamental’s variance by 0.0296. The explanation for 
this result can be found looking at the behavior of the four possible third 
period quotations in the second graph of the same figure: It is not only 
the case that they increase continuously in A. being higher the lower the 
belief about HET clients’ presence in the market. But with increasing 
quotations also their distance from their mean is growing and, hence, the 
variance.





























































































Variance Of All Possible 3rd Period Quotations
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Intercept
Figure 1:
O bservation  2 The quotations’ variance is first, increasing in d and 
then very slowly decreasing. The fundamentals’ variance is con­
tinuously increasing in d.
This implies the following behavior o f excess volatility in the present 
setting: It is first increasing and then decreasing in d until, from a 




























































































Variance Of All Possible 3rd Period Quotations
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
d - HET parameter of price sensitivity
As was shown in the theoretical part of this paper the fundamentals’ 
variance is continuously increasing in the parameter d: At the parame­
ter’s initial value of 0.7 the variance has a value o f 0.0000; at d =  4 it 
reaches a value of 0.0936. The mid-rates’ variance in turn reaches its 
maximum at d =  2.6 and is then slowly decreasing. Both variances be­
havior together implies an excess volatility which is first increasing, then 
decreasing, and finally becoming negative at d =  3.1.
The graph which depicts the quotations’ behavior visualizes the above 
findings: The quotations decrease with an increasing price sensitivity of 
HETs. Initially the quotations are very close to each other since the 
difference between d and g is rather small which renders the impact of 




























































































matter the more the bigger is the difference between HET’s and LET’s 
price sensitivity: Although quotations are falling the distance between 
the different quotations and their mean is growing and, hence, their vari­
ance. This effect is then checked by the quotations’ convexity in d which 
leads to a narrowing of the range of possible quotations and such to a 
slow decrease of the variance.
T he Im pact o f  the Size o f  the L E T ’s P aram eter o f  P rice  Sensi­
tiv ity  g
O bservation  3 Both variances are decreasing in g; hut the mid-rates' 
variance is very high fo r  low values o f g whereas the fundamentals ’ 
variance is hardly affected at all.
Excess volatility, therefore, is always positive, but strongly decreas­
ing in g.
This simulation reverses the picture of the last one: It starts with a 
big difference between HET’s and LET’s parameter o f price sensitivity 
which causes the quotations to be quite different initially. A low price 
sensitivity of LETs allows the trader to quote very high price - the higher 
the more the foregoing history made him believe in a high presence of 
LETs in the market (see the very high quotation of over eight which is 
the quotation of a history of LETs calling only). With the parameters 
converging also the quotations converge more and more strongly thereby 
reducing quotations’ distance from their mean. This is reflected in a 
sharp decrease of the quotations’ variance whose curve tends to become 
almost completely flat. The fundamentals’ variance in turn is hardly 
influenced by a change in g: Its decrease is from an initial value of 0.0726 
to a value of 0.0006. Excess volatility thus drops drastically with an 
increase in g, but remains positive throughout in the present setting.




























































































Variance Of All Possible 3rd Period Quotations
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
g - LET parameter of price sensitivity
Figure 2:
O bservation  4 The mid-rate’s variance is continuously decreasing in 
the subjective prior belief. The fundamentals’ variance remains un­
affected.
Excess volatility is decreasing in the prior belief but is always posi­
tive.
Ill this simulation the possible values for the subjective prior belief 
range from ql =  0 - the belief that no HET is present in the market - to 
ql =  1 - the belief that no LET is present in the market. A look at the 
quotations’ graph, however, reveals that the impact is less strong than 




























































































Variance Of AH Possible 3rd Period Quotations
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Prior belief
Figure 3:
q 1, but only to a rather small degree. The reason for this phenomenon 
is to be found in the trader’s updating rule: His halfening of distances 
between belief and zero  or one leads to a rather quick elimination of 
initially big differences in possible prior beliefs. For example: Assuming 
a history of one HET calling in each period the trader’s third period belief 
will be 0.875 with a prior of 0.5. and 0.975 with the extreme prior of 0.9. 
I.e.: The initial difference of 0.4 between the priors becomes quartered 
in two periods only.
For the above described effect on the quotations the variance is de­
creasing in </l. but not strongly. Excess volatility remains strongly present 




























































































T h e Im pact o f  the R eal D istribution  o f  the P opu lation  v
O bservation  5 The more equal is the population’s distribution between 
HETs and LETs the higher is the fundamentals’ variance. The. 
mid-rate’s variance reaches its maximum at v =  0.4.
Excess volatility follows the mid-rate’s behavior and is always pos­
itive apart from the endpoints where obviously it. has to be. zero.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
True distribution of the population
Figure 4:
The quotations are not influenced by the population’s true distri­
bution; they only depend on the subjective believes. The variance of 
the quotations, however, does depend on v since it is the latter parame­




























































































and, hence, different quotations occur. While the fundamentals’ variance 
reaches its maximum at the point of equal distribution o f the two types, 
at v =  0.5, the mid-rate’s variance has its maximum at v =  0.4. This dif­
ference of maxima depends on the distance between g and d: The further 
d moves away from g (i.e. if the size of d is big relative to g) the stronger 
the two maxima differ. The variance, thus, is bigger when nature puts 
a smaller number of HETs in the market since their price sensitivity is 
relatively high. (The difference between maxima is growing to the left 
only because g < d always.)
Due to the bigger dimension of the mid-rates’ variance with respect 
to the fundamentals’ one excess volatility has its maximum at the same 
point as the former variance.
6.3 Conclusions of the Single Trading Day Simula­
tions
The foregoing simulations show that excess volatility of exchange rates 
can be generated with the theoretical model developed in the first part 
of this paper. The quotations’ volatility, whether excessive or not, is due 
to the trader’s effort to extract information from the incoming phone 
calls and to learn the true distribution of the population. If, instead, 
he always used one and the same arbitrary belief, even if it were not 
correct, exchange rate volatility would be equal to zero : All quotations 
throughout all periods would be equal (assuming an inventory of zero in 
all periods). This implies that also a variance computation referring to 
all observable quotations would give the same result, i.e. it would be 
equal to zero because of equality of all quoted prices.
Excess volatility is present for a wide range of parameter constella­
tions. The degree o f excessiveness depends strongly on the size of the 
different types’ price sensitivity, more precisely: On the relative differ­
ence between the two parameters concerned. Although it may appear 




























































































higher values of HET price sensitivity (and lower values of LET price 
sensitivity) the finding becomes intuitive if one looks at the underlying 
mechanism at work, i.e. the changing relative difference between the 
two parameters. It is evident that bigger differences in price sensitivity 
necessitate bigger differences in prices and, hence, a higher volatility.
The degree of volatility’s excessiveness also depends on the volume 
of trade: In the context of this model price variability, and hence uncer­
tainty, increases with a higher volume of trade, even without having any 
new information flowing into the market.
The impact of the true distribution and the subjective prior belief 
is relatively smaller but still significantly big. The simulations with a 
varying q\ seem to indicate that a higher level of traders’ initial degree 
of informedness is not of high importance in order to check exchange rate 
volatility in the current setting: As long as information is not sure, or 
believed as sure, and learning has to take place it does hardly matter 
how far or close the prior is to the true value of the distribution.
6.4 Analysis of the System’s Long-run Behavior
We now turn to the task of investigating the system’s long-run behavior. 
We are especially interested in finding out whether quotations and vari­
ances do converge at some point in time. I.e.: Does continued learning 
over many trading days and weeks lead to finding the true value of the 
population’s distribution and how does this affect the quotations’ vari­
ance? Furthermore we would like to know whether and how these results 
change with different learning methods: Can convergence be achieved in 
a quicker way with more sophisticated learning methods, and will excess 
volatility be smaller in the pre-convergence periods?
In order to achieve this task the simulation models have been modified 
in the following way: At the end of each trading day’s last period another 
updating takes place - according to the new information that is available 




























































































belief is then being used as the initial belief of the following trading day.
However, at the beginning of period three there are four possible 
histories each of which will be updated. At the end of the first trading 
day there are such eight possible histories. Tracing all possible histories 
over many trading days leads to an explosion of the computational task. 
For this reason a random device has been programmed which in each 
period helps selecting one of the possible histories in a realistic way. The 
random device follows the distribution of the population and imitates 
such the likelihood of receiving a phone call of one of the two types. 
At the beginning of each period this device determines then whether the 
previous period’s belief (or the prior in case of period two) will be updated 
or ’’ downdated” . For the computation of the variance this implies that 
no longer the variance between all possible third period quotations is 
being computed but the variance between all observable quotations of 
one trading day.
As for the simulation of different learning methods a description will 
be given at the beginning of the respective sections.
The parameter values used in the following simulations are the same 
ones as in the ceteris paribus setting of the single trading day simulations, 
i.e.:
a =  2. d =  1.2, q — 0.6. v =  0.4. q\ =  0.5.
Volatility Behavior and Convergence with simplistic Learning
The learning behavior implemented in this simulation is the same one 
as for the single trading day simulations: Depending on which type of 
client calls the distance between the current belief hold and either the 
upper or lower end of the distribution’s interval will be halfened. The 
programmation changed in so far as now, at the end of each period, it is 
the random device which determines in which direction the updating is 




























































































O bservation  6 No convergence of the quotations ’ variance, the beliefs, 
or the quotations themselves is observable for a period of 100 trading 
days.
Volatility is almost always excessive. The magnitude of oscillations 
can even be increasing in later stages of a simulated period.
Variance Of All Quots Of 1 Day
Day
Figure 5:
The three graphs of Figure 5 depict for each day, respectively, the 
variance between all observed quotations of one day, the beliefs of each 
third period, and the quotations of each third period. The quotations 
are the mirror image of the respective beliefs: The more HETs the trader 




























































































is no indication that the beliefs, and hence the quotations, do converge 
over time in the present history of events. Graphs for the other two 
period’s beliefs and quotations have not been reproduced here, but the 
above described pattern is repeated there.
The fundamentals’ variance is depicted as a dashed line in the first 
graph. Since it is unaffected by the belief updating process it remains at 
its level o f 0.0216 throughout the hundred trading days. It can be seen 
that the observed quotations’ variance exceeds the fundamentals’ one in 
almost 90% of the cases. In the current simulation’s history of events the 
magnitude of excess volatility is even increasing during the second half of 
the time span. The latter outcome cannot be generalized, though, since 
it is only due to the specific realizations of the random variable.
The mean profit of the monopolist over a single trading day is equal 
to 9.42 foreign currency units where the mean is taken over the hundred 
trading days’ total daily profits. The mean spread is given by 5.5642 
currency units.
V olatility  B ehavior and C onvergence w ith F ictitiou s P lay Fic­
titious play has been implemented, in the simulation program in the fol­
lowing way: The random device determines whether the trader’s initial 
belief is equal to zero or to one. In the following periods, each time a 
HET calls (i.e. random device <  v) one unit is added to the numerator 
and denominator of the belief variable, in case of a LET calling one unit 
is added to the denominator only. I.e.: updating takes place according 
to the frequency with which a HET is calling.
With this different updating behavior the picture changes drastically 
and we have
O bservation  7 The trader learns the true distribution approximately 
within the first 20-60 trading days.
Excess volatility is present for a few instances only. Volatility drops 


































































































Variance Of All Quote Of 1 Day
0.02
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Day
Figure 6 :
Two examples o f possible one hundred day histories have been repro­
duced here in order to give a better idea of the typical characteristics the 
history of events with fictitious play.
Interestingly, in both examples the variance drops very quickly to 
zero, within a few days only. But it can take the trader significantly 
more time to learn the true distribution approximately. Figure 6 is an 
example of the trader learning the true distribution very quickly: His 
prior happens to be q 1 =  0. The following sequence of phone calls with 
mainly HETs calling have his beliefs circle around the true value of the 
distribution already from the fifth trading day onwards. Consequently, 




























































































Variance Of All Quots Of 1 Day
0 10 20 30 Q u e z o n O f f fU y S if te r io d 70 80 90 100
Figure 7:
certain value. 2.4 for our specific parameter set. The variance, reflecting 
these events, drops considerably quickly and reaches zero  at the twelfth 
trading day. Excess volatility is present in one instance only during these 
days.
In Figure 7, instead, we see a trader who takes much more time to 
learn the true value approximately due to the sequence of phone calls 
reaching him: The trader’s initial belief happens to be equal to one, 
q\ =  1. In the following periods it is only LETs calling him which leads 
him to believe at the end of day 3 that no HET is present in the market. 
A changing sequence of HETs and LETs calling let him then change the 




























































































day 50 onwards his beliefs begin to circle around the true value The 
trader’s quotations reflect this process and remain close to 2.4 from day 
50 onwards.
However, again the variance is excessive only once and drops to zero 
within the first twelve trading days. The reason for this is the mid-rates 
dimension: Even during the first days the difference between quotations 
of subsequent periods is rather small: In a series of hundred simulations 
the biggest difference of first day quotations has been equal to ~  0.7; the 
biggest difference of second days quotations dropped already to ~  0.19. 
The quotations’ difference to their mean reduces thus at a very fast pace, 
and the variance drops quickly to zero.
The mean profit of a single trading day in this last case is 12.53 
currency units. It is considerably higher than the mean profit under 
simplistic learning. The mean spread is given by 5.41 which lies slightly 
below the spread with simplistic learning.
Volatility Behavior and Convergence with Evolutionary Play
In the following simulation learning takes place in an evolutionary way: 
As described above the two different learning rules simplistic learning 
and fictitious play are being played against each other. Since the trader 
is a monopolist in the market he has to check a learning rule’s success by 
some method different from a comparison with other market participants’ 
success, i.e. he has to hypothetically play both rules himself and compare 
their outcomes.
In order to implement this task the following way has been chosen: 
The trader does his updating throughout the day according to both learn­
ing rules. Each new period-belief is then a weighted average of the two 
differently updated beliefs. The rules are given equal weight initially 
(during the first trading day). At the end of each trading day one rule’s 
success is being compared with the other rule’s success. More specifically, 
the monopolist computes the profits he would have made using either of 




























































































tally according to the two rules’ relative success. The new weights will 
be applied over the entire new trading day. This process carries on until 
one of the two rules has a weight equal to zero. Then the more successful 
strategy will be played forever. Convergence thus happens with necessity 
since with an infinite series of random events one of the two limit points 
will be reached. As for the speed we will have to look at the simulation 
results.
However, we could also define the play in a different way: Arrival at 
one of the two limit points does not necessarily imply an end of strat­
egy comparison. The monopolist could carry on comparing hypothetical 
profits with either of the two pure strategies. If he finds one of the two 
more successful he will start again to give some weight to it. To check 
every once and while one’s strategy is not an unrealistic characterization 
of human behavior.
It is this latter set-up that has been implemented in the simulation 
program. Conveniently, the first interpretation builds a subset of the 
latter and can thus be easily observed, too.
O bservation  8 Convergence o f beliefs, quotations, and the variance hap­
pens but is not globally stable. Convergence to fictitious play usually 
appears during the first 100 trading days.
The size o f initial excess volatility depends on which learning rule 
has the relative bigger weight and on its relative size. But with a 
weight of fictitious learning between zero and 1/2 excess volatility 
will always be lower on average than with pure simplistic learning.
































































































Variance Of All QuotsOf 1 Day
Figure 8 :
Once again two examples are represented. The first graph shows a 
history where fictitious play gains more and more weight. However, for a 
relative long period, the first 150 days, simplistic learning is very strong, 
and the picture resembles the one o f simplistic learning with oscillations 
being smaller and volatility being excessive. Then fictitious play begins 
to rapidly gain more weight which results in a convergence of quotations 
and beliefs to the true value of the population’s distribution. In order 
to understand the learning process better below the figure the values of 
the parameter GG  have been reproduced for the first 10 0  trading days. 




























































































trading day. The total weight is equal to fo r ty ; during the first day both 
rules have an equal weight of twenty. It can be seen that during the first 
100 days the evolutionary process seems to favor simplistic learning. But 
the process is fluctuating strongly. Convergence of belief and quotation 
takes only place later on when fictitious play has the full weight. While 
volatility remains constantly close to zero, beliefs and quotations depart 
immediately from the equilibrium value when simplistic learning begins 
to take on more value again.- With evolutionary play a trading day’s 
mean profit equals 11.82 currency units compared to the pure strategy 
payoffs of 9.47 and 11.98 of simplistic and fictitious learning, respectively. 
It is thus only slightly smaller than the latter’s strategy payoff which can 
be attributed to the initial learning phase with simplistic learning being 
very strong. The mean spread is given by 5.46.
GG  =  0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9 ,1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2 .1 3 ,
12,11,12,13,12,13,12,13,14,15,16,17,16.15,14,15,16,15,14,13, 
12,13 ,14,15,14,13,14,13,12,11,10,9 .8 ,7 ,6 ,5 ,6 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,
8, 7, 6, 5. 6, 7, 8, 7, 6, 7, 6, 5, 6. 5, 4. 3, 4, 3, 4, 3,
2 ,1 ,0 ,0 ,1 ,0 ,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 . 7 ,6 ,7 ,8 ,9,10,11.
Figure 9, on the other hand, shows an example of a history where 
convergence to fictitious play takes place rather quickly. But simplistic 
learning is able to regain a substantial amount of weight at a later stage 
of history, and it does so for an extended period46: For about 80 days 
and then again for about 40 days. The GG  figures for those periods are 
reported above. Although simplistic learning does not even attain half 
of the weight its presence is strong enough to let volatility exceed the 
fundamentals’ level.
The mean daily profit now is equal to 12.78 currency units with a
46The relevance of the difference between the possible rules for this play, described 
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Figure 9:
mean daily spread of 5.3628 compared to the respective hypothetical 
profit figures of simplistic learning and fictitious play: 9.53 and 12.88 
for this simulation run. (The respective spread figures are: 5.5435 and 
5.3540.)
Summarizing, there seems to be a gravitational pull towards the pure 
fictitious play strategy. After a relative shorter or longer period the 
game always converges to this strategy. However, it is interesting to 
notice that this convergence does not happen more rapidly, and that 
with a continuing comparison of strategy performances the process can 




























































































could see earlier that, favorable to fictitious play, there is a considerable 
difference in profits between the two learning rules. The explanation for 
our observation here seems to be the short length of the trading day: In 
three periods only, with the right sequence of phone calls chance can let 
the simplistic learning rule be more successful. It will be interesting to 
see later if and how this outcome changes with a longer trading day.
6.5 Conclusions of the Many-Trading-Days Simula­
tions
While in the previous section the different parameters’ impact was an­
alyzed in this section we have looked at the characteristics of different 
learning rules for the system’s long run behavior: Do they lead to a 
convergence of the quotations’ variance and is the eventual convergence 
result stable?
The outcome strongly depends on the specific learning rule in use: 
With simplistic learning no convergence is reached at any point of time 
and the true value of the distribution is never learnt. Even if it were 
learned at some point the trader would not know and continue to update 
according to the incoming phone calls. Volatility is high and frequent in 
this case, and so is excess volatility.
The much smarter updating rule of fictitious play, instead, leads to a 
rather quick learning of the true distribution and, thus, to a convergence 
o f the mid-rates’ variance. Excess volatility is present only for the first 
couple of days and then drops to zero. The convergence result is stable. 
Furthermore, profits with this learning rule are significantly higher than 
with simplistic learning.
Evolutionary play, as a play of the previous two learning rules against 
each other, leads to a convergence with fictitious play being the dominant 
strategy. However, the convergence result is not stable. This outcome is 
dependent on the definition of the game, i.e. whether rule comparison 




























































































has been used here convergence is not stable. Profits with this learning 
rule are fairly close to profits with fictitious play. The slight difference 
in size is due to the ’’ experimental phase” in which strategies are mixed.
6.6 Changes in the Institutional Environment: The 
Length of the Trading Day
As for implementing a change of the institutional environment a length­
ening of the trading day has been chosen: A day now has six rather 
than three periods. The closed position constraint remains, but there is 
more information arriving (three more phone calls) which increases the 
possibility o f learning. We are interested to see how this affects the quo­
tations’ variability and the learning outcome. First we will analyze how 
the system’s sensitivity changes with respect to its parameters. Then 
we would like to see whether and how the characteristics of the different 
learning outcomes change.
For all following simulations the range of parameter value variation 
has been the same as in the case of the shorter trading day. Results are 
thus easily comparable.
T he Im pact o f  the Size o f  the Intercept A
O bservation  9 The mid-rates ’ volatility dependence on the intercept is 
strongly positive and is slightly bigger than in the shorter trading 
day setting.
Excess volatility is throughout positive and increasing in A.
Changing the value of the intercept for a longer trading day setting 
results in an almost identical graph to the shorter trading day outcome. 
The increase o f the mid-rates’ variance is slightly bigger and reaches a 
value of ~  1.5 at A =  5 as compared to ~  1.3 in the first simulation. 
The reason can be found looking at the band of possible sixth period 
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Figure 10:
possible quotations increases to 2 ‘v ' 1 =  32 (where N  is the number of 
periods). The possible quotations’ range is slightly bigger than with 
three periods: At A =  5 the range’s interval is [4.2; 8.21] compared to 
the shorter day’s interval of [4.44; 7.41].
The Impact of the Size of the HET’s Parameter of Price Sensi­
tivity d
Observation 10 With a longer trading day the impact o f HETs’ price 




























































































Excess volatility is therefore higher and present for higher values of 
price sensitivity as well.
Figure 11:
The band of possible sixth period quotations broadens considerably 
with a longer trading day: At d =  4 they range from 0.5067 to 3.0622 
compared to an interval o f [0.5594; 1.9512] for the shorter day. With an 
only minor increase of the mean (from 1.0778 to 1.1152) this leads to a 
considerable increase in the quotations’ variance whose maximum level of 
excessiveness is now reached with 0.3455 (compared to 0.24 beforehand), 
more than a 40% increase. Excess volatility begins to become negative 




























































































The Impact of the Size of the LET’s Parameter of Price Sensi­
tivity g
Observation 11 An increased number of trading periods multiplies the 
parameter’s g impact on the variance and, thus, the size o f excess 
volatility.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
o'----------------- ------------------1----------------- 1----------------- ------------------L
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
g - LET parameter of price sensitivity
Figure 1 2 :
/ As in the previous simulation the impact of an increased number of 
I trading periods is a multiplicative one - for the variance as well as for 
the range of possible quotations. Once again the biggest range of pos­
sible quotations is where the distance between the LET and the HET 




























































































[1.6909; 17.0667] whereas beforehand it was [1.8824:8.4211]. The highest 
quotation possible is more than double as high as was the case for the 
shorter day. Excess volatility, thus, is initially almost three times higher. 
This huge difference becomes soon smaller but remains throughout pos­
itive.
T he Im pact o f  the Size o f  the P rior B elie f q 1
O bservation  12 The prior’s impact on the mid-rates’ variance is very 
small. Excess volatility remains thus positive as before and hardly 
changes with a changing ql.
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With a longer trading day the trader’s initial belief becomes almost 
insignificant for the height of volatility and excess volatility: The variance 
remains around a value of 0.24 which is more or less the average of the 
variance’s possible values during the shorter trading day. This result 
is not surprising since we saw already then that the trader’s specific 
updating rule leads to a rather quick diminution of initially big differences 
in possible priors. This effect becomes reinforced with a longer trading 
day during which more updatings are taking place.
For the same reason also the quotations remain almost invariably, 
like a straight line, around the same level while the value of the prior is 
changing.
T he Im pact o f  the R eal D istribution  o f  the P opu lation  v
O bservation  13 The range of possible last period quotations is slightly 
increased compared to a shorter trading day.
Volatility o f quotations and excess volatility increase considerably. 
The variance's maximum moved to the left to v =  0.3 .
Lengthening the trading day once more has the effect of broadening 
the range of possible last period quotations without changing the mean 
significantly. Consequently the variance is increasing and with it excess 
volatility. However, this effect is more strongly present at the left side of 
the parameter space; after the variance’ maximum it starts to diminish, 
and at v =  0.7 it even becomes reversed. The stronger impact at the left 
side is due to the shifted ’’ skew” of the curve which moved from v =  0.4 
to v =  0.3.
6.7 Conclusions of the Single-Longer-Trading-Day 
Simulations
All simulations of this subsection show that an increased length of the 
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Figure 14:
volatility. The single parameters’ role that has been analyzed in the 
shorter day simulations becomes more pronounced with more periods. 
The reason for this outcome is the increased number of belief updates 
which increases the number of possible last period quotations. Those 
possible quotations are not all observed but they give an indication of the 
possible range of quotations that can be observed throughout a trading 
day.
The broader range of possible quotations magnifies the impact every 
parameter has on the quotations and their variance. Thus, it can be 
concluded that if a trader does not want to stick to his prior but learn by 




























































































day will induce a bigger price variability since more learning results are 
possible.
The following section which deals with the system’s behavior over 
many trading days will show the impact which different learning rules 
may have in an institutional setting of a longer trading day.
6.8 Analysis of the System’s Long-run Behavior
Our specific interest is to check how convergence behavior of the different 
learning rules changes with a longer trading day and how the magnitude 
of the quotations’ variability.
The parameter values are the ceteris paribus values of the foregoing 
simulations. Again, results thus remain easily comparable.
Volatility Behavior and Convergence with simplistic Learning
Observation 14 With a lengthened trading day the mid-rates ’ variance 
tends to be higher and to be higher more often.
Excess volatility, consequently, tends to occur more frequently and 
to be higher.
Two typical examples out of a series of one hundred simulations have 
been reproduced here. At first sight the graphs look rather similar to the 
ones of a shorter trading day. It can be noticed, however, that negative 
excess volatility occurs much less frequently: Twice in the first example 
and only once in the second one (compared to more than ten for the 
shorter day). Furthermore, the maximum oscillations reach more fre­
quently high levels (values higher than 2.5 are reached around 10 — 14 
times compared to around 6  — 9 times); and they can also reach even 
higher levels than is the case for shorter days (~  4.2 in the first example 
compared to ~  3.6). With a longer trading day excess volatility is thus 




























































































Variance Of All Quots Of 1 Day
Figure 15:
The range o f the quotations and beliefs does not change compared to 
the case of less periods per day.
Volatility Behavior and Convergence with Fictitious Play
Observation 15 The speed of learning does not change with a longer 
trading day.
Volatility and excess volatility can initially be. much higher, but they 
fall to a size o f almost zero at the same speed or even faster.
Another two typical examples have been represented here. In most of 




























































































Variance Of All Quots Of 1 Day
§
0 10 20 30 Benêts Of E ^ ry  6th W riod 70 80 90 100
Figure 16:
case for the shorter day. The variance drops then within a few days to a 
value that is close to zero. However, it continues to take on values dif­
ferent from zero  for a much more extended period of time - up until the 
25th to 30th trading day. These two observations can be explained by 
the longer trading day which increases the number of observable quota­
tions throughout one day: With three more periods there are three more 
observations influencing the variance. Like this the variance of the first 
and maybe second day tends to be much higher than has been the case 
for the shorter day. But the higher number of observations continues to 
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Figure 17:
Volatility Behavior and Convergence with Evolutionary Play
Observation 16 Compared to the shorter day convergence is reached 
more quickly and is stable.
Excess volatility is initially higher when the weight of simplistic 































































































Variance Of All Quots Of 1 Day
Figure 18:
11,10,9 ,10 ,9 ,8 ,9 ,8 ,9 ,8 ,7 ,6 ,5 .4 .3 .2 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 ,0 ,0 ,
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 2, 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 2, 3, 2 , 1, 0 . 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 1.
The two cases collected here confirm in some respects our expecta­
tions from the respective simulations of the shorter trading day: The 
learning process converges at a higher speed, and once an equilibrium 
point has been reached it remains very stable (this can be clearly seen in 
the second case where there are many ’’ attempts” of simplistic learning 
to gain more weight but which never succeed to move very far away from 
a zero weight). We relate this outcome to the higher number of peri­
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Figure 19:
likely that by pure chance a better performance becomes attributed to 
the simplistic learning behavior although it simply depends on a lucky 
combination of phone calls.
But while the foregoing simulations showed a positive impact of the 
lengthened trading day on the quotations’ variance it is not possible to 
reidentify that outcome here (even comparing the single elements of GG 
and variances of equal weight structure between the shorter and longer 
trading day). It seems that the increase in volatility due to a higher 
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Figure 20:
GG =  2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,6 ,7 ,6 ,5 ,6 ,5 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 ,0 ,0 ,1 ,2 ,1 ,2 ,
1, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, 3, 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 2 , 1,  
0 ,0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,4 ,3 ,4 ,5 ,4 ,5 ,4 , 3 ,4 ,3 ,2 ,1 ,0 , 
0 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 2, 1, 0 , 1, 0 , 1, 2 , 3 .




























































































6.9 Conclusions of the Many-Longer-Trading-Day 
Simulations
The foregoing simulations indicate that a lengthened trading day in­
creases the volatility of observable quotations. This result seems obvious 
for a learning rule which never leads to a converging outcome. It is less 
obvious, though, for a learning rule like fictitious play that does converge: 
Here more information arriving through more phone calls in a day should 
cause quotations to be closer and the variance to be lower. However, this 
is not the case since the amount of new updates during the first 20-30 
trading days causes the quotations to vary more than the learning process 
does stabilize them. Only from then onwards corrections are so minor 
that they have practically no impact on the variance any more.
It can be concluded that, depending on the variance definition (all 
observable quotations throughout a day or throughout a period) it is 
not recommendable to extend the length of a trading day, or expressed 
positively: In order to check volatility and excess volatility in the foreign 
exchange market it may be worth considering a shortening of the trading 
day.47
Summarizing it can be said that as for the highly stylized monopoly 
case (excess)volatility can be explained with the assumption of simplistic 
learning behavior. The monopolist will (eventually) use fictitious play 
as his dominant strategy which can lead to a fairly rapid conversion of 
volatility to zero. Yet initial volatility is very high for a couple of days. 
Moreover, if we imagine the arrival of new information - something that 
happens very frequently in the foreign exchange market - the learning 
process would have to start all over again, exhibiting the same high initial 
volatility. In other words, in a market with news arrival convergence 
would most probably not occur such that even with a learning rule like
47In our paper on competition in the foreign exchange market (Wuthe (2000)) we 
will investigate how a change in the institutional setting affects these results when 




























































































fictitious play part of the observed excess volatility could be explained.
7 Conclusion
The aim of the foregoing research has been to provide a possible ex­
planation for the commonly observed phenomenon of foreign exchange 
rate volatility. The main focus of our investigation has been the role 
that learning and the institutional framework play. Based on work by 
Zabel (1981) and Suvanto (1993) we have been able to develop a mul­
tiperiod model that shows the exchange rate not only as dependent on 
such parameters as inventory and customers’ price sensitivity, but as well 
on traders’ subjective beliefs about some unknown parameter. This, in 
turn, allows to describe the exchange rate’s movement as linked to the 
trader’s learning process over time. In order to be able to possibly re­
produce exchange rate patterns that exhibit high or excessive volatility 
learning mechanisms have been chosen that are suboptimal in terms of 
learning efficiency. It has been seen in the introductory part that a new 
strand of research is pursuing the impact of agents that behave less than 
fully rational. We in our research48 are able to show that one does not 
necessarily have to assume some kind of boundedly rational behavior in 
order to justify the application of rather simple learning mechanisms. On 
the contrary, they can be a sign of full rationality since their application 
may allow to seize the relative highest profit.
Regarding the spread and the price our results confirm some find­
ings of the literature (see e.g. Ho and Stoll (1983) and Suvanto (1993)) 
while adding novel aspects. As in other models the spread shows to be 
independent of the inventory, with only its placement being affected by 
the inventory. In our model the spread’s independence of the inventory 
is preserved. But its size changes from period to period due to the be­
lief updating process.- The price which adjusts the inventory towards




























































































ail equilibrium level shows the same dependence on traders’ updating 
behavior.
Another key aspect of the market microstructure approach is its con­
cern about the organization of the market. The evolution of prices differs, 
e.g., between markets where a multitude of market makers simultaneously 
announce prices and markets where there is a central auctioneer. As 
an example for the impact of the institutional setting on exchange rate 
volatility we have chosen the length of the trading day. It has turned 
out that in an environment with learning (excess)volatility becomes re­
inforced with a lengthening of the day due to the increased number of 
updating possibilities. This is true not only applying a measure that 
takes into account the number of all possible quotations, but also for a 
measure of the empirical variance. Furthermore, this finding holds as 
well - for an extended period - for learning rules that do converge over 
time.
All these results have been shown to depend in specific ways on cus­
tomers’ price sensitivity, the volume of trade, and population’s true dis­
tribution.
While being a small contribution only with limited scope we are con­
vinced that the here presented research confirms the importance of a 
market microstructure approach to the problem of explaining the phe­
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Appendix 1: The Solution to the Dynamic 
Optimization Problem
The monopolist’s sequential pricing rule can be obtained by solving the 
dynamic optimization problem in the following way:49 We start solving 
for the optimal quotation and spread o f the last period (T  — 1 ,7 ) and 
proceed then recursively backward in time. The solution to the last 
period’s problem is found by means of the following optimization:
»7w »? {9t- i ' [A ■ st -  1 +  B  ■ zt - i — $ • (sr -i  T zr -i)]  +
(1 — q r - i )  ■ [A • s t - i + B  ■ z t - i — 7 • (sj--! +  2r - i ) j }
s . t .  0  — t t i t - i  — E T - i { m , T }  — A  4- Qt — 1 * ^ s t -  1 T  (1  ~  q t —i )  * 7 s t —i-  
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Differentiating the resulting Lagrangian with respect to the controls 
St—i j z t-i, and the multiplier p (_i and solving the first-order conditions 
one obtains:
A  1
l  i Ti----------------- \----------------------1------ ;—  ( % - 1 — i l l ' ) ,qr~\o +  (\ — qr-x )') Qr-if> +  (1 — Qt- i ) 7
___________ B___________
2 ■ (qT-if> + (1 -  9r-i) 7)
_____ A____________ 2_____
9t- i<5 + (1 — Qt- i) 7 9r-\f> + (1 — Q r-i)l
Optimal spread and mid-rate can be inserted into the expected rev­
enue function which results into the following value o f the last-period 
problem:
Jt - i [m f-i] =  A  ■ st- i -I- B  • Z r-i — Qt - i {<$ • [(-s:r -i)2 +  (zt- i )2] }
-  ( 1  -  qt- i ) { - 7  • [(*'t - i )2 +  (~ r -i)2] }  •
Let us now assume that the general solution for the optimal spread 





qtf> + {l ~ qt) 1  qtà +  ( ! - < / , ) 7
( m t -  m ' )  / ( T  -  t ) .
B
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so that the value function is equal to:
Ji [rfy] = A  ■ st +  B  ■ zt — qt {<$ • [(.st)2 + (zt)2] } 




























































































Then one only needs to show that the solution of
Jt-1 — M ax  {<7t-i • \A • S(_i +  B ■ Zt-i — 6 ■ (sf_2 +  +— 1 i^t— 1 L ' ' J
(1 — Qt-i) • [A ■ S(_i +  B ■ zt-\ — 7  • (s2_i +  s2- i ) ] } +  Ei- 1  { . / ( [m
at moment t — 1 results into a spread and mid-rate that give a value 
function of the same form that has been assumed.- Making use* of the 
explicit form of J, [m(] one yields the following optimal mid-rate and 
spread as a solution to the problem:
S(-i
Z t - 1
________ A________
q ,- it  +  (1 -  <7t-i) 7 
B
_________ 1_________
+ (1 — 9i-i) 7
(m t-i -  mm) /  (T  +  1 -  t ) .
2 • (qt~\6 +  (1  -  qt- i )  7 )
Inserting these expressions into the value function gives the following 
expression:
Jt- 1 [rnt_i] — A ■ st- i  +  B ■ zt-\ — qt- 1 {<$ ■ |(.S(_i)“ +  ( i (_ j)2J j 
_  (1 — qt- 1) { —7 • [(-s( - i )2 +  (st—1)“]}  • 
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